A cluster set up before the rules moved into the shared configuration kept
them in each member's config.yml, which the TLS step never looked at — and
then said its remote rules were hostssl. Found on the PoC: plaintext
connections were still accepted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Members' etcd speaks TLS to peers and clients with a certificate from the
cluster's authority and asks clients for one; Patroni reaches it with the
member's certificate and serves its API over TLS. A running plain-HTTP
cluster is moved with Patroni paused, so PostgreSQL serves throughout:
Patroni's lease-free keys are carried over to the new etcd.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A new internal/clientip says who sent a request and how: the connection's
address, scheme and Host, or through a configured proxy what it forwarded.
The base URL in pages and setup scripts, isHTTPS for cookies, and the
per-address limits of auth and the sign-in forms use it. /setup scripts are
no-store.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A wrong password from anywhere counted against the address, so ten locked
its owner out. Attempts are now counted per address and client, with a
looser bound per address alone. The sign-in form carries a token matched
by a cookie (login CSRF). POST /login and /signup are rationed per client
address, a hash waits at most ten seconds for a turn, and server init
writes signup_open: false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve now checks the owner's state for a personal key; the authenticator
treats an inactive owner as a revoked key. Suspension stops the keys within
the cache TTL, reinstatement brings them back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Patroni's REST API accepted changes from anyone on port 8008, and
PostgreSQL ran with sslmode=disable between machines. Setup now keeps a
fourth secret for the API (carried to members of older clusters), issues
each member a certificate from the cluster's authority, writes
restapi.authentication into each member's config and reloads it, and
turns ssl on with hostssl remote rules through an authenticated PATCH of
the shared configuration. The DSN becomes sslmode=verify-full against the
authority's certificate whenever the cluster has TLS, so a control plane
without the authority's key reconnects too. server add authenticates its
PATCH and lets the new control plane in by hostssl. Tried on the e2e
cluster: unauthenticated PATCH 401, plaintext refused, replication
streaming, the control plane on verify-full.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin listener answered any local process: models added, nodes
upgraded, engine keys listed, the heap dumped. /api and /debug now demand
the token the server writes 0600 to its state directory on first start;
ctl, the console and node add send it (sudo, LLMGW_ADMIN_TOKEN or
--token-file). pprof is off unless debug_pprof. admin_listen off loopback
is refused unless admin_remote. Dashboard pages, /metrics and /health are
unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The supervisor drops to the run_as user (default llmgw-engine) when the
agent is root: its credential and groups, a 0700 home under the work
directory as the working directory, HOME and XDG_CACHE_HOME there. A node
without the user keeps engines as root and logs why. node add creates the
user in the video and render groups.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
env is an allowlist of tuning families less path, plugin, library, address
and credential names (NCCL_*_PLUGIN, CUDA_INJECTION64_PATH and the like
got through the old denylist); llama.cpp's LLAMA_ARG_* are checked as
flags. args refuse --trust-remote-code, --log-file, --slot-save-path,
--tool-parser-plugin, --middleware, --allowed-local-media-path and others
that read, write or load, and what the agent sets itself. Checked in the
catalog and again on the node before an engine starts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without agent_tls the control plane served plaintext h2c on every
interface, and any machine reaching it could register as any node. The
server now refuses to start that way unless agent_insecure: true, and then
binds loopback when agent_listen names only a port.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
trusted.pub now holds the release signing key, so self-upgrade, agent
upgrade and node onboarding refuse a release whose checksums are not signed
with it. Onboarding fetched the release on the node and compared it with a
checksum from the same server; the control plane now fetches it for the
node's architecture with release.Fetch, checks signature and checksum, and
hands the bytes over. Release addresses must be https (loopback excepted).
LLMGW_RELEASE_KEY overrides the key only in development builds. The CI
release job fails instead of publishing an unsigned release while a key is
built in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
