Document guardrails, correct what data.md said leaves the cluster, and regenerate the reference

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 12:36:37 +02:00
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@@ -37,6 +37,23 @@ APIs change between minors without a deprecation period.
`incomplete_details.reason: "content_filter"`. `x-llmgw-guard` and
`x-llmgw-guard-policy` say what was done; the usage row records the
action, policy, category and time taken — never the text.
- **Guardrail policies** (`guard:` in server.yaml; see docs/guardrails.md).
- **What is found:** personal data, each kind validated before it counts
(email, phone, IBAN by mod-97, card by Luhn, TCKN by its check digits,
IP); secrets (API keys, AWS, GitHub, Slack, Google, JWT, PEM); prompt
injection seen through disguises (look-alike letters, invisible
characters, base64/hex/URL encoding); deny patterns.
- **What is done:** flag, redact as `[EMAIL_1]`, or block. A request can
be shaped too: a pinned system prompt, the caller's own system messages
dropped, an output limit, tools stripped or refused.
- **Answers:** judged buffered, or a sentence at a time when streamed,
never releasing half a value; tool calls are checked against allow
lists, a count and the request's own schemas.
- **Modes:** `shadow` records what it would do; `no_store` refuses
conversations, notes and models outside the cluster.
- **Where they apply:** `guard.default` everywhere; others attached with
`llmgw ctl guard attach` to an organization, team, project, user or
key, and narrowed like limits.
### Security
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@@ -16,7 +16,16 @@ who made a request, when, how many tokens, and what it cost.
Two features change that, and both are off until somebody turns them on for a
named project, and neither can be turned on without also saying for how long.
Nothing on the serving path leaves the cluster.
Nothing on the serving path leaves the cluster — **unless the catalog has a
model served outside it** (`external:` in a model definition): a request for
that model, or one that falls back to it, sends its prompt to that provider.
A guardrail policy with `no_store` refuses both for the scopes it covers.
**Guardrails** read every prompt and answer they are configured for, in the
gateway's own memory, to judge them. What they record — in the usage row and
the log — is the action, the policy, the category and how long it took: never
the text, the value that matched, or the placeholder map of a redaction. See
[guardrails.md](guardrails.md).
## What is stored, exactly
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@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Guardrails
Written for the operator deciding what the gateway lets through: what a
policy can check, what it can do, and how one is attached to a team.
Without a `guard:` section in `server.yaml` nothing is checked and nothing
costs anything. With one, every request is judged once it is authorised and
within its limits, with its stored conversation spliced in, and before it is
sent to a model; and the answer is judged before the client sees it.
## A policy
```yaml
guard:
# Applied to every request.
default: [baseline]
policies:
baseline:
input:
pii: {secret: block, card: redact}
injection: flag
output:
pii: {secret: block}
finance:
mode: enforce # enforce (default), shadow, off
fail: closed # open (default) or closed, for checks that can fail
no_store: true # no conversations, notes, prefix routing or external models
max_output_tokens: 2048
system_prompt: "You answer questions about Acme's products only."
drop_client_system: true
stream: sentence # sentence (default) or buffer_all
input:
pii: {email: redact, phone: redact, iban: block, tckn: redact}
injection: block
max_chars: 40000
deny:
- {name: codename, regex: "(?i)project falcon", action: block}
output:
pii: {iban: redact, tckn: redact, secret: block}
tools:
allow: [search, fetch]
deny: [shell]
on_denied: strip # strip (default) or block
max_calls_per_turn: 4
validate_arguments: true
```
**What is found.**
- **Personal data:** email, phone, iban, card, tckn, ip. Each is checked
before it counts: IBANs by their mod-97 check, cards by Luhn and issuer
prefix, TCKNs by their two check digits, phone numbers only when written
to be dialled (`+90…`, `00…`, `0532…`).
- **Secrets** (`secret`): OpenAI- and Anthropic-style keys, AWS access key
ids, GitHub, Slack and Google tokens, JWTs, PEM private keys and llmgw's
own keys.
- **Prompt injection:** instructions to drop instructions (English and
Turkish), chat-template control tokens in user text, invisible Unicode,
long encoded blobs. These are found through disguises: fullwidth letters,
Cyrillic look-alikes, zero-width characters, and base64, hex and URL
encoding two levels deep.
- **`deny` patterns:** matched against the text as written, and as a model
reads it once those disguises are removed.
**What is done.**
- **`flag`** lets the request through and records it.
- **`redact`** rewrites the value as a placeholder (`[EMAIL_1]`; the same
value is the same placeholder throughout a request).
- **`block`** stops it.
**Shapes.**
- `system_prompt` is put first.
- `drop_client_system` removes the caller's own system and developer
messages.
- `max_output_tokens` is set where a request asks for none, and lowers one
that asks for more.
- A tool `deny`/`allow` list strips the tool from the request, or refuses
it.
- In the answer, a call to a tool that is not allowed, more calls than
`max_calls_per_turn`, or arguments that do not fit the parameters the
request declared (`validate_arguments`) stop it.
## Where a policy applies
`guard.default` applies everywhere. Others are attached to a part of the
tenancy tree, and apply to everything below it:
```
llmgw ctl guard attach project:Acme/finance/payroll finance
llmgw ctl guard attach key:key-7f3a baseline
llmgw ctl guard list
llmgw ctl guard detach project:Acme/finance/payroll finance
```
Policies narrow, as limits do. A policy attached lower can tighten what
applies above it, never loosen it. Combined, they take:
- the strictest mode and failure;
- for each kind, the strictest action;
- every deny pattern and denied tool;
- only the tools every allow list allows;
- the smallest limits;
- `no_store` if any of them asks;
- every pinned prompt, widest first.
An attachment applies at once.
## What a client sees
**A refused request** is answered with 400:
```json
{"error": {"type": "invalid_request_error", "code": "content_policy_violation",
"message": "this request was refused by the gateway's policy (secret)"}}
```
It names the category, never the text, and costs nothing.
**A stopped answer** ends with `finish_reason: "content_filter"`. A stream
ends with that chunk and `[DONE]`, and the engine is cancelled. The
Responses API reports it as `incomplete` with
`incomplete_details.reason: "content_filter"`.
**Headers:** `x-llmgw-guard` (`flagged`, `redacted`, `blocked`) and
`x-llmgw-guard-policy` say what was done.
**Streams.** A streamed answer is judged a sentence at a time. Text is held
until a sentence, a line or 200 characters ends, released up to its last
whitespace — so a value still arriving is never sent in two halves — and
rewritten if needed. **What was released cannot be taken back**: a policy
that must never let a word through uses `stream: buffer_all`, which holds
the whole answer until it is judged.
## Shadow mode
`mode: shadow` judges and records — the usage row says `shadow-blocked`,
`shadow-redacted` — and changes nothing. Run a new policy in shadow first,
and read what it would have done before enforcing it.
## What is recorded
Each request's usage row has the action, policy, category and the time the
checks took. The access log has the action, stage and policy. Neither has
the text, a matched value, or the placeholder map: the map exists only in
the gateway's memory while the request is served.
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@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ rather than repeated.
| `engines` | `map[string]string` | [Server](#server) |
| `engine_overrides` | `[]EngineOverride` | [Server](#server) |
| `backup_dir` | `string` | [Server](#server) |
| `guard` | `guard.Config` | [Server](#server) |
| `firewall_networks` | `[]string` | [Server](#server) |
| `backup_recipients` | `[]string` | [Server](#server) |
| `releases` | `string` | [Server](#server) |
@@ -1494,6 +1495,15 @@ BackupDir is where `llmgw server backup` writes, and where the newest
archive's age is read for llmgw_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds.
Empty means /var/backups/llmgw-server.
### `guard`
`guard.Config`
Guard is the library of guardrail policies: what requests and answers
are checked for, and what is done. Applied to every request through
guard.default, and to parts of the tenancy tree by attaching them
(llmgw ctl guard attach). Empty checks nothing.
### `firewall_networks`
`[]string`
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@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ import (
llmgwv1 "gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/api/gen/llmgw/v1"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/config"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/guard"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control/adminapi"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control/agentsvc"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control/catalog"
@@ -41,6 +40,7 @@ import (
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control/fleetmetrics"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control/modelsvc"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/control/reconciler"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/guard"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/hf"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/mirror"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/obs"
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@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ var Reference = []Block{
{Key: "engines", Type: "map[string]string", Doc: "Engines are the engines every node installs, and at which version. The\nagents install them themselves — the right build for their hardware,\nchecked against its publisher's checksum and seen to run — so a node is\nnever trusted to already have what somebody once put there.\n\nUnset keeps DefaultEngines. A version replaces the default; an empty\none leaves that engine to be installed by hand.", Nested: ""},
{Key: "engine_overrides", Type: "[]EngineOverride", Doc: "EngineOverrides give some nodes different engines from the rest: a\nvLLM built for CUDA 12 on the Volta cards CUDA 13 dropped, or none at\nall on nodes meant only for llama.cpp. Each picks nodes and lays its\nengines over the cluster's, in order, later ones last; an empty version\nremoves that engine from the nodes it picks.", Nested: ""},
{Key: "backup_dir", Type: "string", Doc: "BackupDir is where `llmgw server backup` writes, and where the newest\narchive's age is read for llmgw_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds.\nEmpty means /var/backups/llmgw-server.", Nested: ""},
{Key: "guard", Type: "guard.Config", Doc: "Guard is the library of guardrail policies: what requests and answers\nare checked for, and what is done. Applied to every request through\nguard.default, and to parts of the tenancy tree by attaching them\n(llmgw ctl guard attach). Empty checks nothing.", Nested: "guard.Config"},
{Key: "firewall_networks", Type: "[]string", Doc: "FirewallNetworks are networks, besides those each machine reaches the\ncluster on, that llmgw's internal ports answer: a monitoring host on\nanother subnet, nodes behind a router. Written into every machine's\nfirewall by `server init`, `node add` and `server add`.", Nested: ""},
{Key: "backup_recipients", Type: "[]string", Doc: "BackupRecipients encrypt every archive `llmgw server backup` writes, to\nwhoever holds one of their keys: age recipients (age1…) or SSH public\nkeys (ssh-ed25519 …, ssh-rsa …), as `age` takes them. An archive holds\nthe certificate authority's key and every secret in the store, and is\ncopied off the machine; encrypted, the copy is safe wherever it lands.\nEmpty writes archives unencrypted, readable by root only.", Nested: ""},
{Key: "releases", Type: "string", Doc: "Releases is where `llmgw ctl upgrade` fetches release binaries from,\nfor this machine and — through their agents — every node. Empty means\nthe project's own releases.", Nested: ""},
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@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ func (g *wordGuard) Output(context.Context, guard.Subject) guard.OutputFilter {
return &stopHi{}
}
func (g *wordGuard) Directives(guard.Subject) guard.Directives { return guard.Directives{NoStore: g.noStore} }
func (g *wordGuard) Directives(guard.Subject) guard.Directives {
return guard.Directives{NoStore: g.noStore}
}
type stopHi struct{ v guard.Verdict }