Fix an agent that could neither explain itself nor stop
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Two bugs found while verifying mTLS against real machines.

session cancelled its own derived context and then asked that context
whether the agent was shutting down. The answer was always yes, so every
stream error read as a clean close: the log said err=<nil>, the backoff
reset, and an agent whose certificate the control plane refused hammered it
forever at the base interval with nothing to diagnose. It now keeps the
parent context to answer that question, and a refusal reaches the operator
naming both the certificate and the claim.

Cancelling the context also did not stop the agent. HTTP/2 watches the
context while the request body is being written, and a bidirectional stream
spends its life blocked on the read side instead, so the read never returned.
Measured on a deployed node: `systemctl stop llmgw-agent` took 90 seconds and
ended in SIGKILL, on every restart. Closing the response when the context
ends is what actually unblocks it.

TestAgentStopsWhenContextEnds hangs reliably without the second fix, which is
the only reason to trust that it tests it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-09-16 08:03:21 +02:00
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listen: ":8080" # client-facing OpenAI API
admin_listen: ":9090" # metrics, health, pprof — do not expose this publicly
# Where node agents connect. Separate from the client port so the fleet-facing
# surface can be firewalled independently. Agents speak plaintext HTTP/2 today,
# so this must stay on a trusted network until mTLS lands (plan §5.6).
# surface can be firewalled independently.
agent_listen: ":7443"
# Mutual TLS on the agent port (plan §5.6). With it, a node's identity is taken
# from its certificate's common name and an agent claiming a different node id
# is refused. Without it the port is plaintext HTTP/2 and anyone who can reach
# it can claim to be any node, so it must stay on a trusted network.
#
# These certificates come from llmgw's own authority, not a public one: public
# authorities stopped issuing the clientAuth usage, so no Let's Encrypt
# certificate can authenticate an agent.
#
# llmgw ctl cert init-ca --dir /etc/llmgw/pki
# llmgw ctl cert issue-server llmgw-ctl --host 10.0.0.140 --dir /etc/llmgw/pki
#
# Every address an agent might dial has to appear in --host, bare IP addresses
# included: hostname verification reads subject alternative names and ignores
# the common name entirely.
#
# This covers the fleet-facing port only. The client-facing API above is public
# and belongs behind a publicly trusted certificate.
#
# agent_tls:
# ca: /etc/llmgw/ca.pem
# cert: /etc/llmgw/server.pem
# key: /etc/llmgw/server-key.pem
router:
scrape_interval: 2s
scrape_timeout: 1s