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Two bugs found while verifying mTLS against real machines. session cancelled its own derived context and then asked that context whether the agent was shutting down. The answer was always yes, so every stream error read as a clean close: the log said err=<nil>, the backoff reset, and an agent whose certificate the control plane refused hammered it forever at the base interval with nothing to diagnose. It now keeps the parent context to answer that question, and a refusal reaches the operator naming both the certificate and the claim. Cancelling the context also did not stop the agent. HTTP/2 watches the context while the request body is being written, and a bidirectional stream spends its life blocked on the read side instead, so the read never returned. Measured on a deployed node: `systemctl stop llmgw-agent` took 90 seconds and ended in SIGKILL, on every restart. Closing the response when the context ends is what actually unblocks it. TestAgentStopsWhenContextEnds hangs reliably without the second fix, which is the only reason to trust that it tests it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
5.3 KiB
YAML
142 lines
5.3 KiB
YAML
# llmgw router configuration (phase 1).
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#
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# The endpoint list is static here. From phase 3 it comes from the control
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# plane instead and this section disappears; everything else stays.
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#
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# Any field can be overridden from the environment with an LLMGW_ prefix and
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# __ for nesting: LLMGW_ROUTER__RETRIES=3
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listen: ":8080" # client-facing OpenAI API
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admin_listen: ":9090" # metrics, health, pprof — do not expose this publicly
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# Where node agents connect. Separate from the client port so the fleet-facing
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# surface can be firewalled independently.
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agent_listen: ":7443"
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# Mutual TLS on the agent port (plan §5.6). With it, a node's identity is taken
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# from its certificate's common name and an agent claiming a different node id
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# is refused. Without it the port is plaintext HTTP/2 and anyone who can reach
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# it can claim to be any node, so it must stay on a trusted network.
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#
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# These certificates come from llmgw's own authority, not a public one: public
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# authorities stopped issuing the clientAuth usage, so no Let's Encrypt
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# certificate can authenticate an agent.
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#
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# llmgw ctl cert init-ca --dir /etc/llmgw/pki
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# llmgw ctl cert issue-server llmgw-ctl --host 10.0.0.140 --dir /etc/llmgw/pki
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#
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# Every address an agent might dial has to appear in --host, bare IP addresses
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# included: hostname verification reads subject alternative names and ignores
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# the common name entirely.
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#
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# This covers the fleet-facing port only. The client-facing API above is public
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# and belongs behind a publicly trusted certificate.
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#
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# agent_tls:
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# ca: /etc/llmgw/ca.pem
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# cert: /etc/llmgw/server.pem
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# key: /etc/llmgw/server-key.pem
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router:
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scrape_interval: 2s
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scrape_timeout: 1s
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# How long an endpoint may go unscraped before it is scored down. It is never
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# dropped for staleness alone: if the whole pool went stale there would be
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# nowhere left to send anything.
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stale_after: 10s
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# Additional endpoints to try after a failure, and only while nothing has
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# reached the client yet.
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retries: 2
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# How long a failing endpoint leaves the candidate pool. A long fallback list
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# with no cooldown turns one endpoint's rate limit into a cluster-wide retry
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# storm.
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cooldown: 15s
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# Consecutive failures that open the breaker. Set to 1 for pure cooldown
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# behaviour.
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failure_threshold: 3
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default_profile: chat # chat | batch | long-context | debug
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session_header: x-session-id # affinity key; falls back to the `user` field
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# Ask engines for usage even when the client did not, so token accounting
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# works regardless of client behaviour. The extra chunk is dropped on the way
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# back to a client that did not ask for it.
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inject_usage: true
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max_body_bytes: 33554432
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timeouts:
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dial: 5s
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response_header: 60s
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first_token: 120s
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idle: 60s # between streamed tokens; catches a wedged engine
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total: 30m
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# Flow control: decides *when* a request may proceed, before scheduling
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# decides where it goes. Without it a batch workload starves interactive
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# traffic, because an engine queue is FIFO and knows nothing about tenants.
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admission:
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enabled: true
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# Until authentication lands, the band comes from a header and is trusted.
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# Do not expose this port to callers who should not be able to promote
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# themselves.
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band_header: x-llmgw-band
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default_band: gold
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# A band waits once pool saturation passes its ceiling, so the cluster
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# degrades from the bottom up. A ceiling of 1.0 means "flow up to the
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# healthy limit"; use a value above 1 for a band that must never wait.
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bands:
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- { name: platinum, priority: 400, saturation_ceiling: 1.00 }
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- { name: gold, priority: 300, saturation_ceiling: 0.85 }
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- { name: silver, priority: 200, saturation_ceiling: 0.60 }
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- { name: bronze, priority: 100, saturation_ceiling: 0.30 }
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# Drop a request that has waited this long: the client has usually given up,
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# and sending the GPU work nobody is waiting for helps no one.
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queue_ttl: 30s
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# Reject immediately once a band's queue is this deep, rather than letting
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# it accumulate silently.
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queue_capacity_per_band: 2000
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interval: 10ms
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# What the scorers normalize against. Measure these with `ctl bench` rather
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# than guessing: target_waiting in particular governs how the whole system
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# behaves under load. Too low starves the GPU, too high brings back queueing
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# delay.
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scoring:
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target_waiting: 4
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target_inflight: 8
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kv_ceiling: 0.9
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session_load_factor: 1.25
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# How aggressively the control plane reconciles.
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control:
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interval: 5s
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base_backoff: 10s
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max_backoff: 10m
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# Node expiry is staged deliberately: a network blip must not tear down
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# replicas that are still serving, and rebuilding a multi-node replica costs
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# tens of minutes of model loading.
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unreachable_after: 15s
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lost_after: 60s
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port_range: [20000, 20999]
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mgmt_interface: eth0
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models:
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- name: llama-3.3-70b
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aliases: [llama]
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fallbacks: [qwen2.5-32b]
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routing_profile: chat
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- name: qwen2.5-32b
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aliases: [qwen]
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routing_profile: batch
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# A static replica list, used only when no model declares a profile. That is the
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# router-only mode for testing against sim-engines; with the control plane
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# running, agents provide the replicas instead.
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#
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# endpoints:
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# - id: sim-1
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# url: http://127.0.0.1:8001
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# models: [llama-3.3-70b]
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# pool: local
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# weight: 1
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