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llmgw/deploy/examples/server.yaml
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Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 4454e1322c Read usage from sums kept as it is written, not from every request
Charts, totals and budgets summed the request table on every view. Usage is
now also summed in the writing transaction into five-minute, hourly and daily
tables per key, person, project and model, with latency and first-token
histograms. Charts read the coarsest tier their slices allow; totals and
budgets compose rows, slices, hours and days, and stay exact. Request records
can be given a retention without moving any total.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 19:43:10 +02:00

280 lines
11 KiB
YAML

# llmgw router configuration (phase 1).
#
# The endpoint list is static here. From phase 3 it comes from the control
# plane instead and this section disappears; everything else stays.
#
# Any field can be overridden from the environment with an LLMGW_ prefix and
# __ for nesting: LLMGW_ROUTER__RETRIES=3
listen: ":8080" # client-facing OpenAI API
admin_listen: "127.0.0.1:9090" # dashboard, management API, pprof — keep it local
# Metrics only, on their own port, so Prometheus can reach them without pprof
# being reachable too. Empty means off; metrics stay on admin_listen either way.
# metrics_listen: "0.0.0.0:9091"
# Where node agents connect. Separate from the client port so the fleet-facing
# surface can be firewalled independently.
agent_listen: ":7443"
# Mutual TLS on the agent port (plan §5.6). With it, a node's identity is taken
# from its certificate's common name and an agent claiming a different node id
# is refused. Without it the port is plaintext HTTP/2 and anyone who can reach
# it can claim to be any node, so it must stay on a trusted network.
#
# These certificates come from llmgw's own authority, not a public one: public
# authorities stopped issuing the clientAuth usage, so no Let's Encrypt
# certificate can authenticate an agent.
#
# llmgw ctl cert init-ca --dir /etc/llmgw/pki
# llmgw ctl cert issue-server llmgw-ctl --host 10.0.0.140 --dir /etc/llmgw/pki
#
# Every address an agent might dial has to appear in --host, bare IP addresses
# included: hostname verification reads subject alternative names and ignores
# the common name entirely.
#
# This covers the fleet-facing port only. The client-facing API above is public
# and belongs behind a publicly trusted certificate.
#
# agent_tls:
# ca: /etc/llmgw/ca.pem
# cert: /etc/llmgw/server.pem
# key: /etc/llmgw/server-key.pem
# The public page at "/". Someone who reaches this address without a key needs a
# route to getting one, and the gateway cannot guess who to send them to.
#
# landing:
# contact: "platform@example.com" # or an https:// URL, or "#platform on Slack"
# notice: "Internal use only."
# API keys on the client-facing port (plan §7.9). Off by default, because a
# gateway on a trusted network with no keys issued still has to serve — but
# nothing else protects that port, so turning it on is what makes it safe to
# expose.
#
# llmgw keys init --store /var/lib/llmgw/llmgw.db
# llmgw keys create --store /var/lib/llmgw/llmgw.db --project default "laptop"
#
# The key is printed once. Only its hash is stored, so there is nothing to
# recover it from.
#
# auth:
# enabled: true
# store: /var/lib/llmgw/llmgw.db
# # How long a resolved key is trusted before being read again. This is the
# # price of keeping the database off the request path: it bounds how long a
# # revoked key keeps working.
# cache_ttl: 30s
# # How long a rejected key is remembered as rejected, so a client looping
# # with a bad key cannot become a database read per request.
# negative_ttl: 5s
#
# # Serve the signup form. What it creates is a pending account that can do
# # nothing until `llmgw users approve` places it in a project, so this is not
# # a way in — it only moves key creation from you to the person who needs one.
# # Off, there is no form and you issue keys with `llmgw keys create --claim`.
# signup_open: true
#
# # What each model costs, in micro-units per thousand tokens. A unit is
# # whatever you decide: self-hosted models have no per-token price, so it can
# # be GPU-seconds, a notional rate, or 1000 everywhere — which turns budgets
# # into plain token quotas.
# #
# # A model priced at zero is exempt from budget checks, which is what lets a
# # key with nothing left still be served a cheap fallback.
# default_price: { prompt_per_1k: 0, completion_per_1k: 0 }
# pricing:
# llama-3.3-70b: { prompt_per_1k: 1000, completion_per_1k: 3000 }
# qwen2.5-32b: { prompt_per_1k: 400, completion_per_1k: 1200 }
#
# # Usage rows are written in batches off the request path. Beyond buffer_size
# # they are dropped rather than blocking a request: losing some accounting is
# # bad, turning a stalled database into an outage is worse.
# flush_interval: 200ms
# batch_size: 500
# buffer_size: 8192
#
# # How long the record of each request is kept (what `ctl request` reads).
# # Charts, totals and budgets come from five-minute sums that are kept, so
# # this only bounds the table that grows by a row a request. 0 keeps all.
# usage_retention: 2160h # 90 days
router:
scrape_interval: 2s
scrape_timeout: 1s
# How long an endpoint may go unscraped before it is scored down. It is never
# dropped for staleness alone: if the whole pool went stale there would be
# nowhere left to send anything.
stale_after: 10s
# Additional endpoints to try after a failure, and only while nothing has
# reached the client yet.
retries: 2
# How long a failing endpoint leaves the candidate pool. A long fallback list
# with no cooldown turns one endpoint's rate limit into a cluster-wide retry
# storm.
cooldown: 15s
# Consecutive failures that open the breaker. Set to 1 for pure cooldown
# behaviour.
failure_threshold: 3
default_profile: chat # chat | batch | long-context | debug
# Approximate prefix routing (plan §7.5 tier 1): send a request to the replica
# that has probably already prefilled its prefix.
#
# It earns its keep when the working set does not fit in one replica's cache.
# With a handful of prompts and a large cache, scattering is free — every
# replica ends up holding everything — and this only adds constraint. Measured
# with sim-engines whose caches were too small for the working set: cache hits
# went from 22.5% to 81.7%.
#
# Watch llmgw_prefix_decisions_total to tune it. A high
# load_balance_override count means the guard is doing its job and affinity is
# not getting a chance; a high cache_miss_min_load means match_ratio or
# min_match is too strict for your traffic.
prefix:
enabled: false
# The shortest match worth acting on, in bytes. Below this the overlap is
# coincidence — two English prompts share "The".
min_match: 64
# The share of the prompt that must match. A short shared header on a very
# long prompt saves almost no prefill.
match_ratio: 0.3
# The imbalance guard, and both must trip before affinity is abandoned.
# Absolute alone fires on an idle cluster where one replica has two requests
# and another none; relative alone fires on a busy one where 200 against 180
# is a rounding error. Without the guard the cache hit rate rises while p99
# collapses.
balance_abs: 8
balance_rel: 1.5
# An engine evicts on its own schedule, so an old record may describe a
# cache that is gone.
ttl: 10m
max_nodes: 100000
session_header: x-session-id # affinity key; falls back to the `user` field
# Ask engines for usage even when the client did not, so token accounting
# works regardless of client behaviour. The extra chunk is dropped on the way
# back to a client that did not ask for it.
inject_usage: true
max_body_bytes: 33554432
timeouts:
dial: 5s
response_header: 60s
first_token: 120s
idle: 60s # between streamed tokens; catches a wedged engine
total: 30m
# Flow control: decides *when* a request may proceed, before scheduling
# decides where it goes. Without it a batch workload starves interactive
# traffic, because an engine queue is FIFO and knows nothing about tenants.
admission:
enabled: true
# With auth on, the key decides the band and this header is ignored. With
# auth off the header is trusted, so any client can promote itself into the
# top band — do not expose the port in that configuration.
band_header: x-llmgw-band
default_band: gold
# A band waits once pool saturation passes its ceiling, so the cluster
# degrades from the bottom up. A ceiling of 1.0 means "flow up to the
# healthy limit"; use a value above 1 for a band that must never wait.
bands:
- { name: platinum, priority: 400, saturation_ceiling: 1.00 }
- { name: gold, priority: 300, saturation_ceiling: 0.85 }
- { name: silver, priority: 200, saturation_ceiling: 0.60 }
- { name: bronze, priority: 100, saturation_ceiling: 0.30 }
# Drop a request that has waited this long: the client has usually given up,
# and sending the GPU work nobody is waiting for helps no one.
queue_ttl: 30s
# Reject immediately once a band's queue is this deep, rather than letting
# it accumulate silently.
queue_capacity_per_band: 2000
interval: 10ms
# What the scorers normalize against. Measure these with `ctl bench` rather
# than guessing: target_waiting in particular governs how the whole system
# behaves under load. Too low starves the GPU, too high brings back queueing
# delay.
scoring:
target_waiting: 4
target_inflight: 8
kv_ceiling: 0.9
session_load_factor: 1.25
# How aggressively the control plane reconciles.
# The engines every node installs, and at which version. Unset keeps the
# versions this release was checked against (llama.cpp b10991). Each agent
# picks the build for its own hardware and installs it itself; changing a
# version here reaches every node on its next connect.
# engines:
# llamacpp: b10991
control:
interval: 5s
base_backoff: 10s
max_backoff: 10m
# Node expiry is staged deliberately: a network blip must not tear down
# replicas that are still serving, and rebuilding a multi-node replica costs
# tens of minutes of model loading.
unreachable_after: 15s
lost_after: 60s
port_range: [20000, 20999]
mgmt_interface: eth0
# Each model needs a source — a weights path or a HuggingFace id — and at least
# one profile if the control plane is to place it. Without profiles the model is
# catalogued but never started, which is the router-only mode below.
models:
- name: llama-3.3-70b
source: meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct
aliases: [llama]
fallbacks: [qwen2.5-32b]
routing_profile: chat
scaling: { min: 1, max: 4 }
profiles:
# Two nodes of four H100s each. A multi-node profile requires a fabric,
# and a replica never spans two of them.
- name: tp8
engine: vllm
gpu_class: h100-80g
tp: 8
nodes: 2
gpus_per_node: 4
priority: 100
weight: 8
startup_timeout: 30m
# Where a whole node is free, one node is cheaper to schedule and faster
# to start than two.
- name: tp4-a100
engine: vllm
gpu_class: a100-40g
tp: 4
priority: 50
weight: 3
startup_timeout: 20m
- name: qwen2.5-32b
source: Qwen/Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct
aliases: [qwen]
routing_profile: batch
scaling: { min: 1, max: 2 }
profiles:
- name: tp2
engine: sglang
gpu_class: h100-80g
tp: 2
priority: 100
weight: 2
startup_timeout: 15m
# A static replica list, used only when no model declares a profile. That is the
# router-only mode for testing against sim-engines; with the control plane
# running, agents provide the replicas instead.
#
# endpoints:
# - id: sim-1
# url: http://127.0.0.1:8001
# models: [llama-3.3-70b]
# pool: local
# weight: 1