Security review: fix traversal, identity, injection and takeover paths
Findings from a full review (auth/API, CA and rack channel, config generation, integrations, UI/agents/scripts), each verified in code: - rack binary endpoint read any region file via arch=../.. (CA key) - render endpoint traversal; machine-reported MACs used as file paths - delegated intermediates could mint admin/rack identities and IPs; identities now require root-issued certs, intermediates are ServerAuth-only with both name types constrained - rack certs were ServerAuth for rack-chosen SANs: now client-only; racks accept only the region's own cert; join checks the CA fingerprint; unbound join codes cannot take an existing name; job results bound to the rack that took them - rack self-update: region signs binaries with the CA key, the root unit verifies against the join-time CA in a root-owned dir - dnsmasq reads a checked, root-owned copy limited to generated options - commissioning could overwrite deployed machines; MAC takeover of PXE - injection into dnsmasq/cloud-init/PXE/udev/DNS via names and machine-reported strings; stored XSS in the UI; CSP and cross-origin protection; deploy agent shell injection and seed traversal - Redfish requests confined to the BMC's /redfish/ tree - admin_http defaults to loopback; body limits and timeouts; secrets off command lines Also: IPAM claim/reconcile race, sync stopping on one error, watchdog race, release wiping the wrong disk, SAN LUNs as auto targets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -154,8 +154,12 @@ func bmcHTTPClient(c *bmcCreds) *http.Client {
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// bmcBase builds https://host[:port] from the record; IPMI's port is not Redfish's.
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func bmcBase(c *bmcCreds, scheme string, defPort int) string {
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a := strings.TrimRight(c.Address, "/")
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if strings.Contains(a, "://") {
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return a
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if strings.Contains(a, "://") { // an operator's https://host:port: scheme and authority only
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u, err := url.Parse(a)
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if err != nil || (u.Scheme != "https" && u.Scheme != "http") || u.Host == "" || u.User != nil {
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return "https://invalid.invalid"
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}
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return u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host
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}
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port := c.Port
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if port == 623 || port == 0 {
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@@ -175,12 +179,35 @@ func newRF(c *bmcCreds) *rfClient {
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return &rfClient{base: bmcBase(c, "https", 443), user: c.User, pass: c.Password, hc: bmcHTTPClient(c)}
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}
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// resolve turns a path the BMC handed us (@odata.id, an action target, a task
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// monitor) into one on this BMC. Vendors return relative paths, full URLs and
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// trailing slashes; anything that would leave the BMC or the Redfish tree (and
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// take the credentials with it) is refused.
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func (r *rfClient) resolve(p string) (string, error) {
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if strings.Contains(p, "://") {
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u, err := url.Parse(p)
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b, _ := url.Parse(r.base)
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if err != nil || b == nil || !strings.EqualFold(u.Host, b.Host) || u.User != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("the BMC pointed at %q, which is not this BMC", p)
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}
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p = u.RequestURI()
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/redfish/") || strings.Contains(p, "/../") || strings.HasSuffix(p, "/..") {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("the BMC pointed at %q, outside /redfish/", p)
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}
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return p, nil
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}
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func (r *rfClient) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body, out any) (int, error) {
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var rd io.Reader
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if body != nil {
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b, _ := json.Marshal(body)
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rd = bytes.NewReader(b)
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}
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path, err := r.resolve(path)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, r.base+path, rd)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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