Security review: fix traversal, identity, injection and takeover paths
Findings from a full review (auth/API, CA and rack channel, config generation, integrations, UI/agents/scripts), each verified in code: - rack binary endpoint read any region file via arch=../.. (CA key) - render endpoint traversal; machine-reported MACs used as file paths - delegated intermediates could mint admin/rack identities and IPs; identities now require root-issued certs, intermediates are ServerAuth-only with both name types constrained - rack certs were ServerAuth for rack-chosen SANs: now client-only; racks accept only the region's own cert; join checks the CA fingerprint; unbound join codes cannot take an existing name; job results bound to the rack that took them - rack self-update: region signs binaries with the CA key, the root unit verifies against the join-time CA in a root-owned dir - dnsmasq reads a checked, root-owned copy limited to generated options - commissioning could overwrite deployed machines; MAC takeover of PXE - injection into dnsmasq/cloud-init/PXE/udev/DNS via names and machine-reported strings; stored XSS in the UI; CSP and cross-origin protection; deploy agent shell injection and seed traversal - Redfish requests confined to the BMC's /redfish/ tree - admin_http defaults to loopback; body limits and timeouts; secrets off command lines Also: IPAM claim/reconcile race, sync stopping on one error, watchdog race, release wiping the wrong disk, SAN LUNs as auto targets. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -15,7 +15,74 @@ publish a tag that has no section here.
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`_rollcall.<name>` TXT marker and update prerequisites, so foreign records are never overwritten;
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drift is detected by querying). `rollcall dns`, `rollcall dns sync [-dry]`, a doctor check.
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### Security
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A review of the whole code base; the fixes below. Upgrading: rerun `deploy/install.sh` on the
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region and `deploy/install-rack.sh` on rack hosts (new dnsmasq layout, signed rack updates).
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- **Region file read (critical).** A rack controller could read any file on the region (CA key,
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config) through `/api/v1/rack/binary?arch=../..`. `arch` is now a known architecture.
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- **Path traversal.** In `/api/v1/render/...` (admin) as well.
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- **Machine-reported MACs.** A MAC could be a path, letting a PXE-booting host make the rack write
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outside the TFTP directory. Only real hardware addresses are accepted. Rack controllers write only
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`01-xx-..` file names.
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- **Delegated intermediates.** An ACME intermediate could mint admin or rack certificates (name
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constraints do not cover the CN), and IP addresses when only a domain was permitted.
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- Admin and rack identities must now be signed by the root itself.
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- Intermediates carry a ServerAuth-only EKU, and the unconstrained name type is closed.
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- **Rack certificates.** These were ServerAuth certificates for any address the rack reported, so
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one rack could pose as the region.
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- They are now client-only with no names.
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- Racks accept only the region's own certificate.
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- `rack join` checks the returned CA against the fingerprint in the code.
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- An unbound join code cannot take over an existing rack's name.
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- Job results are accepted only from the rack that took the job.
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- **Rack self-update.** The root unit ran a binary the unprivileged rack user staged.
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- The region now signs each binary with its CA key.
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- The root unit verifies the signature against the CA from `rack join`, in a root-owned directory,
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without following links.
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- **dnsmasq as root.** dnsmasq (root) read configuration the rollcall user writes, and the reload
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script copied files through links in rollcall's directory.
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- It now reads a checked copy in `/var/lib/rollcall-dnsmasq`.
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- The copy may hold only the options Rollcall generates: nothing that runs a program or includes
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a file.
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- **Machine record takeover.** Any host on the provisioning network could overwrite a deployed
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machine's record (and BMC) by reporting its UUID.
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- Known machines are re-commissioned only when `ready`, `recommission` or failed.
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- A MAC another machine owns keeps its boot file.
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- The rack controller of a ready machine is not changed by whoever reports it.
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- **Injection into dnsmasq, cloud-init, PXE menus, udev rules and DNS updates.** Subnet domain and
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gateway, host names, NIC names, reservation names and machine-reported identity strings are now
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validated or reduced to one line. Machine IDs are letters and digits only.
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- **Web UI.**
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- Escaping is fixed for machine-reported inventory fields (stored XSS).
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- A Content-Security-Policy, `frame-ancestors 'none'`, nosniff and no-referrer are set.
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- Cross-origin state-changing requests are refused (`http.CrossOriginProtection`), so a page
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elsewhere cannot use a browser's admin certificate.
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- `?token=` is no longer logged.
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- **Deploy agent.**
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- The image URL no longer goes into a shell command; the checksum is taken over the bytes written.
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- Seed files cannot leave the target root.
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- The BMC password is not kept in the fallback inventory file.
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- **Redfish.** Requests stay on the BMC and under `/redfish/`: paths the BMC returns cannot send the
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credentials elsewhere, and `scheme://` addresses are reduced to scheme and host.
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- **Defaults and limits.**
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- `admin_http` defaults to `loopback`.
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- Request bodies are capped (commissioning 4 MB, all 16 MB), with read and idle timeouts.
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- `bootstrap.sh` and `publish-image.sh` keep the database password and API tokens off command
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lines.
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### Fixed
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- IPAM: a reconcile running during an allocation could delete the record just reserved in NetBox.
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- IPAM and DNS sync: one failing record no longer stops the rest of the pass, deletes included.
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Reservations are stored in one spelling.
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- The job watchdog could fail a job that had just started.
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- Release without `-disk` wiped the smallest disk, not the one the OS was deployed to. Automatic
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disk choice skips SAN LUNs (iSCSI, FC, SRP).
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- RFC 2136 lookups follow the request context. The marker is not removed when the database cannot
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say whether other records need it.
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- Smaller fixes:
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- `seq` in templates is capped.
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- Layout selector `ib:-1` no longer panics.
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- Redfish detection no longer runs on a machine that cannot be read.
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- dnsmasq busy loop in proxy mode (a dnsmasq bug with tagged proxy ranges, found with gdb): proxy
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ranges are untagged, PXE services limited by interface; `dhcp-boot`/`dhcp-match` only for served
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subnets, no `dhcp-host` lines for proxied ones.
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