docs: agents over HTTPS
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ region and `deploy/install-rack.sh` on rack hosts (new dnsmasq layout, signed ra
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accepted only from the machine's own address (its static lease); through a rack, the rack's
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accepted only from the machine's own address (its static lease); through a rack, the rack's
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`X-Forwarded-For` entry counts. A machine without a fixed address binds a job to its first user.
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`X-Forwarded-For` entry counts. A machine without a fixed address binds a job to its first user.
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`agent_source_check: false` turns this off.
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`agent_source_check: false` turns this off.
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- **Agents over HTTPS.** Rack controllers get a server certificate for their own host and serve
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the agents' endpoints and images on 443. Agents accept the CA by the fingerprint on the PXE
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command line and do not fall back to HTTP. Old agents keep working over HTTP. The commissioning
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image has to be rebuilt to get the new agents.
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- **BMC certificates.** HTTPS BMCs (Redfish, Proxmox) are pinned on first use. The certificate
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- **BMC certificates.** HTTPS BMCs (Redfish, Proxmox) are pinned on first use. The certificate
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is read in a handshake that carries no credentials, and a changed certificate gets none
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is read in a handshake that carries no credentials, and a changed certificate gets none
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(`tls_fingerprint`; cleared on an address change or a BMC firmware update by Rollcall).
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(`tls_fingerprint`; cleared on an address change or a BMC firmware update by Rollcall).
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ exists.
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| Network access | a default route; the internet or a mirror for packages and cloud images |
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| Network access | a default route; the internet or a mirror for packages and cloud images |
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| Later: provisioning network | an interface of this host (or of a rack controller) on the VLAN where machines PXE-boot |
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| Later: provisioning network | an interface of this host (or of a rack controller) on the VLAN where machines PXE-boot |
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| Later: BMC network | the rack controller must reach the machines' BMCs (IPMI, Redfish) |
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| Later: BMC network | the rack controller must reach the machines' BMCs (IPMI, Redfish) |
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| Ports | DHCP 67/udp and TFTP 69/udp on the provisioning network; HTTP 80 for machines; HTTPS 443 for people and rack controllers |
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| Ports | DHCP 67/udp and TFTP 69/udp on the provisioning network; HTTP 80 and HTTPS 443 for machines (agents use 443); HTTPS 443 for people and rack controllers |
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The release bundle `rollcall-<version>-linux-amd64.tar.gz` holds the binary,
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The release bundle `rollcall-<version>-linux-amd64.tar.gz` holds the binary,
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`deploy/` and `agent/`. From a checkout, `deploy/bootstrap.sh` builds the binary
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`deploy/` and `agent/`. From a checkout, `deploy/bootstrap.sh` builds the binary
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@@ -401,6 +401,28 @@ The lab runs both: `pxe-server` (embedded, 10.213.77.0/24) and `pxe-rack2`
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pxe-rack2 and its virtual BMC on pxe-rack2. Rack ↔ region traffic is mutual
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pxe-rack2 and its virtual BMC on pxe-rack2. Rack ↔ region traffic is mutual
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TLS (next section), so the BMC passwords of queued commands are encrypted.
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TLS (next section), so the BMC passwords of queued commands are encrypted.
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### Agents over HTTPS
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Agents talk to their rack controller over HTTPS: the commissioning agent,
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the deploy agent and the image download. The region gives each rack a
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server certificate for its own URL's host (`CN=rack-server:NAME`, server
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use only, never one of the region's addresses). The rack serves the
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agents' endpoints on `<host>:443` as well as on HTTP; `tls_listen` in
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`rack.json` changes the port, `off` turns it off. The embedded rack uses
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the region's own HTTPS listener.
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The pxelinux command line carries `rollcall.tls=https://HOST` and
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`rollcall.ca=<SHA-256 of the CA>`. An agent fetches `/ca.pem`, accepts it
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only by that fingerprint, and from then on uses HTTPS with it. When TLS
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was asked for and fails, it does not fall back to HTTP.
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What stays on HTTP: live-boot fetching the commissioning squashfs, and
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`/ca.pem` itself (checked by its fingerprint). This keeps BMC passwords
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and seed files from anyone who only listens, and from an HTTP server
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posing as the rack. TFTP and the kernel and initrd stay unauthenticated,
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so an attacker who can rewrite boot files on the wire is not stopped;
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that needs UEFI Secure Boot with signed images.
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### DHCP already on the network: proxy DHCP
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### DHCP already on the network: proxy DHCP
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Where the site's DHCP server keeps handing out addresses (a corporate DHCP,
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Where the site's DHCP server keeps handing out addresses (a corporate DHCP,
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