docs: agents over HTTPS
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -401,6 +401,28 @@ The lab runs both: `pxe-server` (embedded, 10.213.77.0/24) and `pxe-rack2`
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pxe-rack2 and its virtual BMC on pxe-rack2. Rack ↔ region traffic is mutual
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TLS (next section), so the BMC passwords of queued commands are encrypted.
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### Agents over HTTPS
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Agents talk to their rack controller over HTTPS: the commissioning agent,
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the deploy agent and the image download. The region gives each rack a
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server certificate for its own URL's host (`CN=rack-server:NAME`, server
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use only, never one of the region's addresses). The rack serves the
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agents' endpoints on `<host>:443` as well as on HTTP; `tls_listen` in
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`rack.json` changes the port, `off` turns it off. The embedded rack uses
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the region's own HTTPS listener.
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The pxelinux command line carries `rollcall.tls=https://HOST` and
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`rollcall.ca=<SHA-256 of the CA>`. An agent fetches `/ca.pem`, accepts it
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only by that fingerprint, and from then on uses HTTPS with it. When TLS
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was asked for and fails, it does not fall back to HTTP.
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What stays on HTTP: live-boot fetching the commissioning squashfs, and
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`/ca.pem` itself (checked by its fingerprint). This keeps BMC passwords
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and seed files from anyone who only listens, and from an HTTP server
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posing as the rack. TFTP and the kernel and initrd stay unauthenticated,
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so an attacker who can rewrite boot files on the wire is not stopped;
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that needs UEFI Secure Boot with signed images.
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### DHCP already on the network: proxy DHCP
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Where the site's DHCP server keeps handing out addresses (a corporate DHCP,
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