docs: agents over HTTPS
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-30 02:26:25 +01:00
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@@ -401,6 +401,28 @@ The lab runs both: `pxe-server` (embedded, 10.213.77.0/24) and `pxe-rack2`
pxe-rack2 and its virtual BMC on pxe-rack2. Rack ↔ region traffic is mutual
TLS (next section), so the BMC passwords of queued commands are encrypted.
### Agents over HTTPS
Agents talk to their rack controller over HTTPS: the commissioning agent,
the deploy agent and the image download. The region gives each rack a
server certificate for its own URL's host (`CN=rack-server:NAME`, server
use only, never one of the region's addresses). The rack serves the
agents' endpoints on `<host>:443` as well as on HTTP; `tls_listen` in
`rack.json` changes the port, `off` turns it off. The embedded rack uses
the region's own HTTPS listener.
The pxelinux command line carries `rollcall.tls=https://HOST` and
`rollcall.ca=<SHA-256 of the CA>`. An agent fetches `/ca.pem`, accepts it
only by that fingerprint, and from then on uses HTTPS with it. When TLS
was asked for and fails, it does not fall back to HTTP.
What stays on HTTP: live-boot fetching the commissioning squashfs, and
`/ca.pem` itself (checked by its fingerprint). This keeps BMC passwords
and seed files from anyone who only listens, and from an HTTP server
posing as the rack. TFTP and the kernel and initrd stay unauthenticated,
so an attacker who can rewrite boot files on the wire is not stopped;
that needs UEFI Secure Boot with signed images.
### DHCP already on the network: proxy DHCP
Where the site's DHCP server keeps handing out addresses (a corporate DHCP,