CA delegation: name-constrained intermediates, root rotation, ACME node certificates
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New roots carry path length 1. `rollcall ca intermediate` signs a CSR (or a
generated key) as an intermediate limited to the permitted domains and
address ranges; a root with path length 0 refuses and `rollcall ca rotate`
replaces it. deploy/tags/acme-cert.yaml gets a node certificate from an
ACME server under such an intermediate and renews it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-28 10:23:26 +01:00
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@@ -430,6 +430,18 @@ plane is: `ca_dir` (default `/etc/rollcall/ca`) holds `ca.pem` and
unverified), stateless overlays get it as `.CA`. `rollcall ca issue NAME
-host h1,h2 [-client]` issues leaves for anything else (Slurm REST, a
registry, a web front end).
* **Delegation.** The root may sign one level of intermediate CAs, each
limited by name constraints to the domains and address ranges it serves:
`rollcall ca intermediate caddy -permit int.example.com,10.213.0.0/16
-csr caddy.csr` signs a CSR (the key stays on the host that made it). An ACME
server under that intermediate (Caddy's `acme_server`, step-ca) then issues
short-lived certificates to nodes with certbot or acme.sh; everything that
trusts the Rollcall CA trusts them, and nothing outside the permitted names
can be issued. Roots created before this (path length 0) cannot delegate:
`rollcall ca rotate -yes` replaces the root, keeping the old one as a
backup; rack controllers then join again and clients trust the new
fingerprint. `deploy/tags/acme-cert.yaml` is a tag that fetches a node
certificate at first boot and renews it.
## Power drivers