llmgw/internal/account/password.go

// Package account is the human half of authentication: people sign up, an
// operator approves them, and they issue their own API keys from a profile page
// (plan §7.9).
//
// This is deliberately a different mechanism from the one in internal/auth.
// That one authenticates machines holding 256-bit random keys; this one
// authenticates people holding passwords they chose. The two have opposite
// requirements — a fast hash is correct there and wrong here — and keeping them
// apart is what stops one set of assumptions leaking into the other.
package account

import (
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"encoding/base64"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"strings"

	"golang.org/x/crypto/argon2"
)

// Argon2 parameters. OWASP's current floor for argon2id, which costs roughly
// 50ms per attempt on ordinary hardware — slow enough to make an offline
// dictionary attack expensive, fast enough that a login does not feel broken.
//
// They are stored with each hash, so raising them later leaves existing
// passwords working until their owners next sign in.
const (
	argonTime    = 3
	argonMemory  = 64 * 1024 // KiB
	argonThreads = 4
	argonKeyLen  = 32
	saltLen      = 16
)

// MinPasswordLen is the only password rule.
//
// Length is the one requirement that reliably buys entropy. Composition rules —
// a digit, a symbol, a capital — push people towards Password1! and produce
// less entropy than they cost, so there are none.
const MinPasswordLen = 12

// ErrWeakPassword says a password is too short to accept.
var ErrWeakPassword = fmt.Errorf("a password must be at least %d characters", MinPasswordLen)

// ErrBadHash says a stored hash could not be parsed.
var ErrBadHash = errors.New("unreadable password hash")

// HashPassword derives a storable hash.
func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
	if len([]rune(password)) < MinPasswordLen {
		return "", ErrWeakPassword
	}
	salt := make([]byte, saltLen)
	if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	sum := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, argonTime, argonMemory, argonThreads, argonKeyLen)

	b64 := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString
	return fmt.Sprintf("$argon2id$v=%d$m=%d,t=%d,p=%d$%s$%s",
		argon2.Version, argonMemory, argonTime, argonThreads, b64(salt), b64(sum)), nil
}

// VerifyPassword reports whether a password matches a stored hash.
//
// The comparison is constant time. The parameters come from the hash rather
// than from the constants above, so a hash written under older settings still
// verifies.
func VerifyPassword(password, encoded string) (bool, error) {
	parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
	if len(parts) != 6 || parts[1] != "argon2id" {
		return false, ErrBadHash
	}

	var version int
	if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[2], "v=%d", &version); err != nil || version != argon2.Version {
		return false, ErrBadHash
	}
	var memory, time uint32
	var threads uint8
	if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(parts[3], "m=%d,t=%d,p=%d", &memory, &time, &threads); err != nil {
		return false, ErrBadHash
	}

	salt, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[4])
	if err != nil {
		return false, ErrBadHash
	}
	want, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[5])
	if err != nil {
		return false, ErrBadHash
	}

	got := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, time, memory, threads, uint32(len(want)))
	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1, nil
}

// dummyHash is verified against when no account matches, so a login attempt for
// an address that does not exist costs the same time as one that does.
//
// Without it, a stopwatch enumerates every account on the system.
var dummyHash string

func init() {
	h, err := HashPassword(strings.Repeat("x", MinPasswordLen))
	if err != nil {
		panic("account: cannot build the dummy hash: " + err.Error())
	}
	dummyHash = h
}