Llama Guard 3 1B could not tell ordinary coding requests from harmful ones:
on the PoC it scored "continue" 0.51, "continue the code above" 0.89 and
"how do I kill all child processes in bash" 0.92 unsafe, against 0.97 to
1.00 for harmful requests, at Q4_K_M and Q8_0 alike, with its own template.
A site had "continue" refused. Qwen3Guard-Gen 0.6B gave the ordinary ones
0.15 at the most and the harmful ones 1.00, in 0.8 GB on CPUs.
- format qwen3guard: its prompt written out as its template writes it, for
requests and answers, and its Safe / Unsafe / Controversial verdict read;
controversial counts as the policy's judge.controversial says, safe by
default.
- judge.models: judges asked in turn, the first that answers deciding; a
failure is recorded against the judge that failed. guard judge use sets
the order, replacing categories none of the judges names.
- known judges (Qwen3Guard 0.6B/4B/8B, Llama Guard 1B/8B): guard judge
enable serves any of them, --gpu the 4B on the roomiest GPU class as a
standard model; the leader fetches and serves one a policy names that the
catalog lacks.
- server init installs qwen3guard-0.6b with the baseline's categories.
- a judge reads a long text by its start and end, which fit its context,
rather than overflowing it and refusing the request under fail: closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Everything in server.yaml that is not one machine's own is now a versioned
document in the store (cluster_settings), the same on every control plane.
The first start against a store imports the file's cluster keys, with the
baseline guard policy when there is none; after that those keys in a file
are ignored, with a warning.
Each control plane polls the document's version and its own server.yaml's
hash. A change is validated and applied: guard live (Gate.Replace), anything
else by a graceful restart that systemd brings back, standbys first and the
leader 30s later. A version that does not load on a machine is not applied;
at start the newest one that loads is used, so a bad edit cannot keep every
control plane down.
llmgw ctl config show/get/set/unset/edit/history/rollback, the admin API
under /api/v1/settings, and the console's Settings screen, which layers the
store's document over the machine's file, write it. Commands beside the
control plane that read cluster keys (init, node add, server add, backup,
upgrade) read the layered configuration; init --bundle writes offline to
the store once it holds the settings.
A standby that becomes the leader re-reads models, engine choices and
facility holds from the store.
Retires appendGuardIfMissing: the import does it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An upgrade replaces the binary and leaves server.yaml alone, so a control
plane installed before guardrails stayed unguarded. Run again, init now
appends the baseline guard section (and so fetches the judge) when the file
has no guard key at all, keeping the old file as server.yaml.bak-<time>.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A starter model with no room failed init after ten minutes and left the
firewall and the judge uninstalled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
server init (and the setup screens) write guard.default [baseline] —
secrets refused, cards masked, injection recorded, the judge refusing
S1-S4, S7, S9-S12 in prompts and answers, fail open after 5s — fetch the
judge into the mirror and run it on a node's CPU. --no-guard-model leaves
it out. The closing text names what init cannot do: TLS on the client
port and backup recipients.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
mirror init sets a machine up as the model mirror — the user, /srv/models,
and a unit serving files on :8081 and the management API on :8082 — and
server init --mirror points the control plane at it instead of running one.
Before, that took a unit written by hand and an edit to server.yaml.
The management API can fetch and delete models and answered anyone who
could reach it. mirror serve --api-allow limits it to the addresses given
and the machine itself; mirror init passes the control plane's. The unit
text is shared with the one server init writes for a mirror beside it.
With --no-node the starter model is still fetched and catalogued, unpinned,
so it starts on the first node added, and the init form shows the mirror in
use instead of offering to run one.
Tried on three empty VMs: the mirror answered the control plane and refused
the node, and the starter model came up on the node when it was added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
server init now also:
- runs a model mirror beside the control plane (/srv/models, bytes on
:8081 at an address nodes reach, management API on loopback so it
needs no certificate) and adds it to server.yaml;
- makes the machine a node of its own control plane: issues its agent
certificate, writes agent.yaml labelled as the control plane, starts
llmgw-agent, and waits for it to register and install llama.cpp;
- checks for NVIDIA GPUs with nvidia-smi, and reports a card on the PCI
bus whose driver does not answer rather than ignoring it;
- fetches Qwen2.5 0.5B (Q4_K_M) into the mirror and adds it to the
catalog pinned to this node: a llama.cpp profile per GPU class found,
with a CPU profile as the fallback, then waits for it to serve.
--no-mirror, --no-node and --no-model leave these out. Every step looks
before it acts, so a rerun finishes what an interrupted one started.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
