ea4dd37f80af44432cedc856b67b8f5fba577366
30
Commits
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1c57a4e378 |
Let the catalog change while the cluster is running
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m29s
Adding a model was an operator procedure with downtime: edit a file on the control plane, restart it, wait out the settling window, watch replicas churn while adoption catches up. I did that eight times in a day, and one of the restarts cost two minutes of outage while stalled replicas timed out. None of it was necessary. The reconciler already compares desired against actual on every pass, so a new catalog is simply a different desired. A Catalog stays immutable — New is the only way to build one and it refuses an invalid one — and what changes is which immutable catalog is current. Readers take the pointer and finish their operation against it, so a swap mid-request is invisible rather than a race. The router is told rather than asked, the same shape as the endpoint list and for the same reason: a push happens once per change, a pull would happen once per request. The router still seeds from configuration as well as being pushed to. A router with a static endpoint list and no control plane is a supported mode and has nothing to push it a catalog; without seeding it would resolve no model at all. Which turned up a bug that was latent while catalogs were fixed. reconcileModel only ever visits models that are in the catalog, so a replica whose model had been removed was visited by nothing: it kept its GPUs, kept counting, and kept running an engine for a name no client could ask for. The endpoint publisher skipped such a replica with the comment "the reconciler will tear it down", which was not true. It is now, and the comment says what actually happens instead of what was assumed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9d8cd5e284 |
Track which replicas are actually being used, and summarise the fleet
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m28s
Two things a cluster with many nodes and many GPUs needs that were missing, and they are the same thing seen from two distances. Idle tracking. The control plane knew what was placed and whether it was healthy, never whether anyone wanted it — so on a fleet with more models than cards there was no way to answer the first question anyone asks, which is what can I stop. The router is the only thing that knows, so it now reports it: a timestamp written in Acquire, where a request already meets an endpoint under a lock already held, and collected once a tick as a map. That shape is the point. Per-request notification would be a firehose carrying one bit — the newest timestamp wins — and this costs the same on four replicas as on four hundred. It travels through an interface in the direction opposite EndpointSink, for the same reason that one exists: the control plane decides what should run, the router knows whether anyone wants it, and neither should need to be in the other's process to say so. Unknown is kept distinct from idle throughout. A router that has just restarted knows nothing, and a zero timestamp would be the oldest idle replica in every comparison — so one restart would nominate an entire fleet for eviction. Absent from the map, "-" in the table, negative in the JSON, and IdleFor returns a second value rather than a duration anything could act on by mistake. ctl status. A per-node listing is right for four nodes and wrong for two hundred: how full am I, what is broken, what is holding cards nobody is using are aggregates, and reading them off a long table is a chore, which means it gets skipped. Capacity per GPU class with usage bars, free whole nodes per fabric — the number that decides whether a multi-node replica can land, since free cards on the wrong fabric are not capacity for a model that spans nodes — replica and model counts, models that cannot be placed, and what has gone unasked-for. Derived from the same state the tables show, so it cannot disagree with them. Unhealthy GPUs count as neither used nor free, because counting them free is how a cluster looks like it has room it does not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c115681259 |
Meter a project nobody set limits on
CI / test (push) Has been cancelled
Unlimited was the default. Creating a project without limits is the easy path and the common one — the "default" project on this cluster is one, and the person using it is metered by nothing at all. The first sign of that is the bill or the outage. auth.default_rpm and default_tpm now apply to a key no scope gives a limit to. Zero keeps the old behaviour, which is still a reasonable choice; the point is that it becomes a choice rather than an omission. Applied after the chain rather than folded in as its widest scope, because a default is a fallback and not a ceiling: a project deliberately given 600 rpm must keep it, and tightening would silently cap it at the default. An explicit limit wins in both directions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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db448a9e87 |
Stop using a liveness timeout as a generation budget
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m23s
response_header sounds like a check that the endpoint is alive, and for a streaming request it is: headers arrive before generation starts. For a non-streaming request the engine sends nothing until the completion is finished, so the same setting is the total generation budget wearing a liveness timeout's name. At 60s that was invisible on GPUs and a hard cap of roughly a hundred tokens on qwen2.5-coder-14b at 1.7 tokens a second. A request for 120 tokens failed at exactly one minute, and neither the setting's name nor the error said why. Two transports now: the short header timeout for streaming, where it still catches a sick endpoint, and a generation budget for non-streaming, defaulting to ten minutes. One number could not mean both things. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e9fe3ad379 |
Know how big a model's context is, and what it can do
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m32s
Three things the gateway did not know about its own models, all of which surfaced this week as somebody else's bug. Context length. Nothing read it, /v1/models did not publish it, and an over-long prompt was not refused: it was admitted, scheduled, given a replica and a slot, and rejected by the engine in whatever shape that engine chose. A client sizing prompts from /v1/models had nothing to read. It is now declared per model, published when known, and checked before authentication work or a queue slot is spent — with a ten percent margin, because the estimate is bytes over four and being a few percent out must not turn a valid request into a refusal. Capabilities. The gateway forwards a tools array to any model, and one that cannot use them answers in prose; every OpenAI-compatible client then behaves as though the model is broken, and the only way to find out was to try it. Declared rather than discovered, because no engine will say — which is why these are claims, and why the next commit makes engine-check verify the tool-calling one instead of trusting it. And a bug found while wiring the first: the token estimate was taken from the routing prefix. That prefix stops at 2 KB by design, so every prompt above it estimated as 512 tokens however long it really was, and TPM limits undercounted exactly the requests that consume the most. Prefix routing wants a bounded head of the conversation; a token estimate wants all of it. They are now separate functions, and structured multimodal content counts rather than measuring zero. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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45d0dee470 |
Let a reply full of code be downloaded as a zip
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m25s
Asking a coding model for anything real produces a small tree, and the only way to get it out of the page was to select each block and paste it somewhere. A reply containing fenced code now offers a zip, with the directory structure the model described. Server-side, because the interesting part is the filenames. They are written by a language model and they go into an archive that somebody extracts with a tool that trusts archives, so "../../.ssh/authorized_keys" and "/etc/cron.d/x" are inputs to expect rather than hope against. archive/zip and a sanitiser with tests beat string handling in a browser. An absolute path is made relative — it cannot escape once the leading separator is gone, and refusing a file over a leading slash throws away work. Anything that still escapes after cleaning is rejected rather than repaired, because silently turning ../../evil.go into evil.go puts a file somewhere the reader did not expect; it gets a generated name instead. Naming follows what models actually do: on the fence (```go:cmd/main.go, ```main.go, ```go main.go, title="x"), or on the line above it as a heading or comment. Only the two lines immediately above, so a sentence mentioning main.go is not read as a filename. A block nobody named still comes back under a generated name, because losing code because it was unlabelled is worse than naming it badly, and two blocks claiming one path both survive — models show a file and then show it again with one line changed. Nothing is stored: the reply arrives, the zip goes back, neither is kept. The endpoint sits behind the same session guard and CSRF check as /chat/send. Two of these tests asserted the wrong thing when first written — that an absolute path must be refused, and that hyphens are stripped from the archive name. Both were corrected to what the code should do rather than the code changed to match them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0a98d01361 |
Say when a chat reply was cut off, and stop cutting it so early
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m20s
Reported as the model not completing a request and stopping. It did complete — it ran out of room. The chat page caps a turn at max_tokens and then never looked at finish_reason, so a reply that hit the cap ended mid-word and looked exactly like one that was finished. The silence was the real defect. A reader has no way to tell "the model had nothing more to say" from "the page stopped it", and the only clue is that the last sentence ends abruptly. 512 was also too low. It was chosen when every model here was a 0.5B answering in a paragraph; it is about a screenful of code, so a coding model gets cut off inside the first function it writes. 2048 now, which is still a bound — the reason for having one has not changed. The notice is appended beside the reply, never into it: that element holds model output placed with textContent, and building markup in the same node is how the careful handling everywhere else gets undone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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082d52bc97 |
Stop shipping a placeholder that looks like a value, and say what is served
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m23s
A user copied the curl from the profile page and sent it as it stood. Every other field in that snippet is filled in for them — the base URL, the key they had just been issued — so "model": "MODEL" reads as a value rather than a blank, and they got: no endpoint serves "MODEL" which is true and useless. It reads the same whether the name was a typo, a placeholder left in from the documentation, or a real outage, and it never says what would have worked. The message now lists what is being served, capped at ten with a count for the rest, and says plainly when nothing is. That list is what /v1/models already returns to the same caller, so it discloses nothing new. The profile page's example now names a model that is actually running, real ones before simulated — the point of an example someone can run is that it runs, and sending a first request to the sim engine would answer in Greek letters. The landing and claim pages keep a placeholder, because they are served without a key and deliberately say nothing about what is here; theirs is <model-name>, which cannot be mistaken for a value, with a line saying where to get the real one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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72b03a1a1c |
Say which model is simulated instead of letting it look broken
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m31s
big-model runs on the sim engine, whose whole vocabulary is the Greek alphabet, cycled at a fixed rate until max_tokens. That is what it is for: with no H100s it is the only thing exercising the TP8 two-node path, the fabric invariant and rebuild-after-node-loss. The output is the point. What was wrong is that nothing said so. /v1/models returned it with owned_by "llmgw", identical to the real model, and the chat picker sorted purely by name — so "big-model" led the list, was preselected by the browser, and anyone who typed a question and pressed Send got Greek letters back with no explanation. Reported as the model spitting out crap, which is a fair reading of what it looks like from outside. Simulated is derived from the profiles rather than configured: an operator who adds a sim profile and forgets a flag would be shipping placeholder text under a real model's name. A model counts as simulated only when every profile is, because one real profile means the request can still come back as inference. The marker on /v1/models is owned_by "llmgw-sim", which is already what the sim engine calls itself on its own /v1/models — the gateway was flattening a distinction that existed one layer down. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3b67b1fe42 |
Stop the dashboard linking to pages that are not where it is
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m25s
Clicking "metrics" on the web dashboard answered "no api key was provided". The page is served twice and its navigation assumed one of them. Metrics, pprof and the management API exist on the admin listener; account administration, the profile and the chat exist on the client-facing port. The nav offered the first set in both places, so on the public port those links fell through to the API-key middleware — which is a far more confusing way to say "that is not here" than a 404 would have been. Each page now offers what is actually reachable from it, and the public one says where the rest lives rather than pretending it does not exist, including why that port is not exposed: pprof can dump the process heap, and the heap holds every API key in plaintext. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a075ff4120 |
Add approximate prefix routing, and find out it did nothing
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m19s
Tier 1 of plan §7.5: a radix tree of request prefixes that estimates which replica has already prefilled one. Bytes, not tokens — needing the engine's exact tokenizer is what makes tier 2 a separate project. It went in inert, and the decision metric is what caught it: 144 lookups, zero hits. The cause was a rule I had written and tested for. A node's label is the first request that created it, so the second request for the same system prompt diverges in its last few bytes — a new question after the same preamble, the single most common shape there is. Requiring the whole label to match threw away the 700 bytes they shared. What matters is the shared head, because that is what the engine cached, and a partial label match now counts. Two unit tests asserted the wrong rule and have been inverted. With that fixed, measured end to end against engines whose caches are too small for the working set: 22.5% cache hits without, 81.7% with, and the breakdown shows the misses are exactly the first round, when the tree is empty. The scenario matters as much as the number. With a handful of prompts and a large cache, scattering is free — every replica ends up holding everything — and prefix routing can only add constraint. The first version of the test measured that case and showed a loss, which was a true statement about a situation the feature is not for. Two things keep it from being the disaster prefix routing usually is. The imbalance guard, which needs both an absolute and a relative gap before it fires, because either alone misfires — absolute on an idle cluster, relative on a busy one. And it is a scorer rather than a filter: affinity is a vote the queue and inflight scorers can outvote, not a rule. The tree records the replica the picker actually chose, not the one the scorer proposed, and a node prefers the replica it has seen most rather than most recently — a count is stable under a randomizing picker, where recency just chases whatever the picker last did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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de21649ad6 |
Add an in-browser chat, without putting a key in the browser
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m13s
So someone can try a model without setting up a client, and — more often — tell whether a problem is the gateway or their code. The page carries a session, and the server turns that into the identity an API key would have produced, resolved from the person's project. The request then goes down the ordinary path by being handed to the same handler /v1 uses: admission, model allowlist, rate limits, budget, accounting. There is exactly one request path, so there is no second place for its rules to drift — and without that, a playground is a hole in every limit the rest of the gateway enforces. The allowlist test posts a forbidden model and expects 403 for that reason. The body is rebuilt rather than forwarded, so the page cannot set fields it has no business setting: a stream:false that would hang the reader, a max_tokens large enough to occupy a replica for an hour. One turn is capped at 512 tokens. The picker offers what is actually served and allowed, not what is catalogued, because offering a model with no replica produces a 503 the reader cannot interpret. Inline vanilla JavaScript, for the same reason the charts are hand-drawn SVG. It streams, because on CPU inference ten seconds is normal and a chat that hangs and then dumps a paragraph feels broken. Replies are written with textContent throughout: model output and user input have no business being parsed as markup. Its POSTs carry the CSRF token in a header, which a cross-site form cannot set at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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859f08da9b |
Approve accounts from the browser, and draw the traffic
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m19s
Two things the dashboard was missing: it could not act, and it was a column of numbers. Account administration moves to /admin/users — approving into a project, suspending, reinstating. That is the work an operator does constantly and it should not need a terminal. Three things stay on the CLI, and the line is not arbitrary: promoting someone to admin, resetting a password, and issuing a key on another person's behalf each turn a stolen admin session into more than it was — permanent access, or somebody else's account. Approving and suspending do not. Suspending signs the account out everywhere, or suspension is advisory until the session happens to expire, and an admin cannot suspend themselves, which is not a thing an interface should let you do by misclicking. The charts are inline SVG generated in Go. A charting library would mean a JavaScript toolchain in CI and a megabyte of bundle for what is a list of rectangles, and the single-binary goal rules that out. Hourly over a day: fine enough to show a working day, coarse enough that one slow minute is not an incident. Empty hours are filled in, because a chart with hours missing where nothing happened reads as a chart with hours missing from the data. The SVG is marked as trusted HTML, so everything that reaches it is either a number this package computed or escaped explicitly, and a bar's colour can only be one of four names — a colour that could be anything is a way to write CSS into every page the chart appears on. There are tests for both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e519dc587c |
Serve the cluster dashboard over the web, without serving pprof with it
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m21s
Reaching it meant an SSH tunnel, because the page lived on the admin listener and that listener is bound to loopback. Opening the port was never the way to fix that: it also serves pprof, and pprof can dump the process heap, where every API key sits in plaintext. Exposing the port would have been exposing the key store. So the page moves rather than the port. The same dashboard is now mounted at /admin on the client-facing port, behind the session and CSRF machinery that already guards /profile, gated on a flag on the account. The admin listener keeps pprof and metrics and stays on loopback. One bit, not a role system: it grants looking. Everything that changes the cluster or issues a credential stays on the CLI, where it needs a shell rather than a session — which keeps the worst case of a stolen admin cookie to "saw the cluster" rather than "drained your fleet". Someone without the flag gets 404, not 403. A 403 confirms the page is there and that admin accounts exist here, which is free reconnaissance; 404 is what every other unknown path returns. The profile page does not show a link to a door the visitor cannot open. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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79e459d9ff |
Let people change their own password, and operators reset a lost one
CI / test (push) Failing after 1m11s
The account system shipped without either, which made the first forgotten password an unanswerable support request. Changing it requires the current one. A session is what an attacker gets from a borrowed laptop or a stolen cookie; the password is what they do not have, and without the check the first thing they would do is take the account. Every session is closed, including the browser doing the changing — leaving the others open would mean a password change does nothing about the reason someone is changing it. A new session is then opened for the browser in front of us, so the person who just proved their password is not thrown back to the sign-in page. That response also carries a new CSRF cookie, so the forms it renders take the new token rather than the one the request arrived with; there is a test that posts a form from that exact page. Guessing the current password is bounded the same way sign-in is, because someone holding a stolen session should not get unlimited attempts at the password that would let them keep it. There is no self-service reset: this gateway sends no email, and a reset link with nowhere to send it is not a reset. `llmgw users reset-password` is the operator's answer, and it closes their sessions too — if someone lost their password, the reason might be that somebody else has it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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216fc9bb03 |
Let people sign up, be approved, and issue their own keys
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m9s
Every key needed an operator with a shell. This adds the login system that made that necessary, which is the thing I argued against building until it was asked for — so it is built as if it will be attacked, because a public login form is. Signing up produces an account that can do nothing. Approval is what makes it work and stays on the CLI: having a shell on the control plane is what makes someone an administrator, and that is a smaller thing to get right than roles and an admin UI that mints credentials. The details that matter: Passwords are argon2id, where a slow hash is correct — the input is chosen by a human and has a dictionary, which is the opposite of an API key. Both kinds of authentication now live in this codebase and they are in separate packages so neither set of assumptions leaks into the other. Length is the only rule: composition rules push people towards Password1! and cost more entropy than they buy. Signup never says whether an address already has an account, and sign-in answers the same way for a wrong password and a missing account — verifying against a dummy hash when there is no user, so a stopwatch cannot enumerate accounts. Account state is checked after the password, not before, so guessing an address reveals nothing about it. Guessing is bounded per address rather than per IP: an attacker has many addresses to come from and one to guess against, and limiting by IP locks out an office behind one NAT. Sessions are server-side, so signing out and suspending take effect immediately rather than whenever a token expires; suspension is checked in the same query that resolves the session, because a second round trip is a check somebody eventually forgets. Every state-changing form carries a CSRF token verified against a hash in the session — a cookie authenticates the browser, not the page that asked. Key ownership is enforced in the UPDATE rather than by reading first, so a guessed key id from another account changes nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8d35faf6f8 |
Give the landing page somewhere to send people
CI / test (push) Successful in 56s
The page explained the API, said keys come from an operator, and left the reader there. Someone who reaches the address without a key had no route to getting one, which is where onboarding stopped. `landing.contact` is that route, because the gateway cannot guess who to ask. An address becomes a mailto link, an http(s) URL stays a link, and anything else — a channel, a queue, a person — is shown as text. Other schemes are never linked: this string comes from configuration, configuration is not always written by whoever runs the gateway, and a javascript: href on a page served to every visitor is a short path to a stored XSS. Escaping the text does not make a scheme safe. Unconfigured, it now says something rather than nothing, and the page explains that a key arrives as a one-time link so the reader knows what to expect before it lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3ed211b2f4 |
Onboard users with one-time links instead of pasted keys
CI / test (push) Successful in 2m43s
Issuing a key worked; getting it to the person it was issued for did not. The operator had a secret on their terminal and no way to send it that did not leave a bearer credential in a chat log forever. `keys create --claim` prints a link instead. GET shows a button and consumes nothing; POST reveals the key and burns the link. That split is not politeness — chat clients, mail scanners and link previewers fetch URLs the moment they are posted, so a GET that consumed the claim would mean the first thing to unfurl the link destroys the key before anyone reads it. A pending claim has to hold the key somewhere, which would otherwise put a working credential in the database and undo what hashing bought. So the key is sealed with a key derived from the link's own token, and the token is never stored — only its hash. A database leak yields two useless hashes and a blob nothing in the database can open. HKDF rather than the raw token, so the value used for lookup can never become the value that decrypts. Consuming is one UPDATE moving claimed_at off NULL, so two people opening the same link produce one key rather than two copies. A used link, an expired one and a token that was never real all render identically, because saying which confirms that a token was once valid. The page is no-store, no-referrer and noindex: the URL is itself the credential. `GET /me` reports a key's own limits and spend, so nobody has to ask an operator to read a dashboard they cannot reach. Outside /v1, because it is not part of the OpenAI API. docs/onboarding.md is written for whoever operates this, including the parts that are deliberately absent — no self-service, no SSO, and why. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1839832b8b |
Add a landing page and a read-only cluster dashboard
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m2s
Pasting the gateway's address into a browser returned 404, which looks like a broken endpoint rather than one that tells you how to use it. Two pages, and the split between them is a security boundary rather than a layout choice. The landing page is served without a key — it has to be, because the person reading it is the one who does not have one yet — so it contains no data at all: it says how to connect, not what is here. Model names stay behind /v1/models. It reconstructs the address from the forwarded headers so the copy-pasteable example names the address the client actually used rather than the internal one; those headers are reflected into displayed text and never used for a decision. The dashboard shows nodes, models, replicas, placement failures and usage, and lives on the admin listener only. That listener is loopback-bound and also serves pprof, which can dump the process heap — where API keys sit in plaintext — so reaching the page from elsewhere is an SSH tunnel's job. It is read-only: anything that mints a credential stays in `llmgw keys`, where it needs a shell rather than a browser session this project has no way to authenticate. Mounting the landing page uncovered a hole in the exemption list. An entry ending in "/" was a prefix rule, and "/" ends in "/", so exempting the landing page would have exempted every path there is — authentication still installed, still logging, and letting the whole API through. "/" is now exact, with a test enumerating what must and must not be exempt. Server-rendered templates and one stylesheet, embedded. The single-binary goal rules out a JavaScript toolchain and nothing on either page needs one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0b93fb2883 |
Enforce budgets and rate limits, and write usage off the request path
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m7s
The second half of phase 5. A key now has a cost, a quota and a bill. Rate limits use a sliding window rather than a fixed one. A fixed window lets a caller send its whole minute's allowance in the last second of one window and again in the first second of the next, so the observed rate is twice the configured limit exactly when the system is least able to take it. Checking and charging are one operation, or two concurrent requests both see room and both take it. Token limits are checked against an estimate, because the real count only exists once the request has run; the difference is charged afterwards, so a caller who consistently underestimates is still bounded, one window late. A request with no max_tokens gets a modest assumption rather than zero — assuming zero would let an unbounded request through every token limit. Limits are checked before admission, not after: a request over its quota should be refused rather than queued, where it would occupy a band's capacity to no purpose. All refusals are 429, but a spent budget carries no Retry-After because waiting does not help until the period rolls over, and saying otherwise turns one client into a retry loop. Usage goes to a buffered channel and is written in batches. Record never blocks: if the buffer fills — a database stalled long enough to lose eight thousand records — records are dropped and counted, because losing accounting is bad and turning a stalled database into an outage is worse. A clean shutdown drains what is queued; those are requests that were already served. Failures are logged at error, since silently losing billing data is the kind of thing discovered at the end of a month. Requests are accounted whatever their outcome. A request that used a GPU and then failed still used it, and a key that could spend nothing by failing would be a way around a budget. Budgets are counted in memory and restored from the store at startup, so a restart does not hand every key a fresh allowance. The budget period travels with the reservation rather than being re-derived, because a monthly budget credited to a daily counter is a budget that never binds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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45c8cd23a3 |
Close the gateway: API keys, tenancy and model allowlists
CI / test (push) Successful in 2m34s
Until now anything that could reach the client port could use every model in the catalog. A key now resolves to an identity, and that identity decides what it may do. Authentication wraps the whole mux rather than checking inside each handler, so adding a route cannot add an unauthenticated one by omission. Health stays open, because a load balancer has no key and a health check that needs one reports the gateway down. Nothing on the request path reads the database. A key is resolved once and answered from memory until the entry expires; rejections are cached too, so a client looping with a bad key cannot turn into a database read per request. The price is that a revocation takes up to cache_ttl to take effect, which is the trade stated in the configuration next to the knob. A store failure is not an authentication answer: it is never cached as one and returns 503, not 401 — sending someone hunting for a key problem that does not exist wastes the one thing an incident is short of. A revoked key is refused with the same message as an unknown one, because saying otherwise confirms the key was real. With auth on the band comes from the key and the band header is ignored. The header was trusted only while there was nothing to consult, and it let any client promote itself into the top priority band. Tenant fairness within a band is now per key rather than per session, so one caller cannot take a band by opening many sessions. Allowlists are decided per model, not per string: a model's canonical name and every alias name the same thing, so either form works in an allowlist and no alias can reach a model that was not allowed. The first version of that test passed without the resolution being there at all, which is why it now checks all four combinations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f19db242ae |
Stop naming a metric llama.cpp does not have, and say so when it happens
Deployed against real llama.cpp, every scrape failed. The mapping named llamacpp:kv_cache_usage_ratio; build b10991 serves fifteen metric families and none is a cache ratio. Because KV usage was mandatory, that one absent name threw away the two metrics the engine does publish, and the router scheduled to all three replicas blind while the cluster looked healthy. A mapping that leaves a metric unnamed now means the engine does not publish it, and the field stays zero. Naming one the engine does not serve is still a violation, so this does not become a way to tolerate a typo. Running and waiting can never be omitted: an engine that reports neither what it is doing nor what is queued cannot be scheduled against at all. For llama.cpp this costs the KV half of the saturation signal, which is a real loss softened by its fixed slot count — queue depth already says when it is full. The second half is why it took a deployment to notice. A contract violation was logged per scrape at debug level, so at the default level nothing said anything. It is now a warning, once, with a matching line when it clears. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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501db3d3e8 |
Add the llama.cpp engine, and let a profile ask for no GPU
llama.cpp is what makes a cluster with no cards useful: it serves the same OpenAI API on CPU, so the whole path — placement, supervision, scraping, scheduling, admission — can be exercised end to end on ordinary machines. Three things had to give way for it. A profile may now omit its GPU class, and that is how it says it runs on the CPU. Only engines that can actually serve without a card may omit it; for vLLM an omitted class stays an error, because otherwise a typo becomes a replica placed on a machine with no hardware and diagnosed minutes later during model loading. Placement spreads CPU replicas instead of bin packing them, since unlike GPUs there is no allocation to stop two of them sharing a machine's cores. Metric mappings are now per engine rather than per cluster. llama.cpp calls the same three numbers requests_processing, requests_deferred and kv_cache_usage_ratio, and a single global mapping would leave half a mixed fleet unmeasurable. An empty mapping still defaults to vLLM's names; one that names its own Running metric is taken as a complete statement, so the fields it leaves blank stay blank rather than being filled with names that engine cannot have. The adapter refuses multi-node and tensor-parallel profiles. llama.cpp splits across local GPUs by a different mechanism than this adapter drives, and accepting either would produce a replica that starts and then serves from one machine while the catalog believes it has several. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e8d90cf375 |
Treat a zombie as dead, and test fairness where it is deterministic
CI / test (push) Successful in 52s
CI went red on Linux with two failures that never appear on macOS. Both were worth the trip. The first is a real bug. processAlive used kill(pid, 0), which succeeds on a zombie — a process that has exited and is only waiting to be reaped. That happens for real whenever an engine's parent dies before it does and nothing reaps the orphan, which in a container is the normal case: PID 1 is usually the workload rather than an init. The supervisor would then report a dead adopted engine as running forever, and hold its GPUs against every future placement. Zombies are now detected through procfs on Linux, where the answer exists, and the check degrades to its old behaviour elsewhere rather than to something worse. The second was a bad test. TestTenantFairnessWithinBand asserted on the order goroutines sent to a channel after being admitted, which is the order the Go scheduler woke them, not the order the dispatcher chose. Under load it measured the runtime. The rotation itself lives in bandQueue.pop, which is pure, so it is tested there — including what happens when a tenant runs out mid-rotation and when a cancelled waiter is removed. The controller-level test now asserts the thing that is actually stable: nobody is starved. Verified with three consecutive `go test -race ./...` runs in a Linux container. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e1eb1d4149 |
Phase 3: ctl, and make draining a rolling move
CI / test (push) Failing after 50s
ctl talks to a management API on the admin listener, not the client-facing one. The two have different audiences: one serves inference to whoever holds an API key, the other lets a caller cordon nodes and read the cluster's shape. - nodes surfaces unhealthy GPUs and why they are excluded. That is usually the answer when a node looks idle but nothing will schedule onto it, and it was invisible before. - explain-placement prints every candidate considered and why it was rejected. - replicas shows the shards a replica is made of, with per-shard errors. - cordon, uncordon and drain are one endpoint with different targets, because the difference between cordon and drain is exactly what an operator needs to be sure of before running either. Draining had to be fixed first to make ctl drain worth having. A drained replica was stopped on the next pass, which cuts in-flight requests — the thing draining exists to avoid. Now a node marked Draining has its replicas drained, the model falls below its desired count, a replacement is placed elsewhere, and the original is stopped only once the replacement is serving. A grace period bounds it, because draining the only node that can host a model would otherwise never finish and the node could never be taken out of service. Verified against a two-node cluster of real binaries: draining moved a replica to the surviving node and traffic kept returning 200 throughout. ctl logs is deliberately absent. It needs a request/response pair the agent protocol does not have, and the failure path already ships an engine log tail with every status report — so the case that matters most is covered, and reading a healthy shard's output on demand is not worth a protocol change yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2373726efd |
Agent stream: connect the fleet to the control plane
CI / test (push) Failing after 1m29s
One bidirectional connect-go stream per node, carrying registration, heartbeats and shard status up, and start, stop and drain down. The agent dials out: GPU nodes sit behind firewalls far more often than a control plane does, and an outbound connection needs no inbound rule on every node in the fleet. - registration carries the whole hardware inventory, so there is no separate discovery call and a reconnecting agent refreshes what the scheduler knows. The fabric labels travel with it; they cannot be inferred from the wire, so losing them in transit would silently disable multi-node placement. - agentsvc is both the stream handler and the reconciler's dispatcher, because it holds the open streams and is therefore the only thing that can deliver a command to a node. - the agent validates a profile before launching anything, since an engine that refuses a profile does so after minutes of loading, then supervises the process and reports every transition with the engine's output tail on failure. - reconnects forever with jittered backoff. A control plane restart must not require touching every GPU node, and a fleet must not reconnect in lockstep and knock it over again. Engines keep serving throughout, because the router talks to them directly. llmgw agent is real now, and llmgw server runs a control plane whenever any model declares a profile. The static endpoint list stays for router-only runs. Verified with real binaries as separate processes: the agent registers, a replica is placed, an engine launches through the vLLM adapter's actual argument construction, streaming traffic is served, and killing the agent moves the node through unreachable to lost with placement explaining why nothing can run. config.Model and catalog.Model were the same thing described twice, so the router now reads catalog entries directly and the validation rules live in one place. Still missing: mTLS. The stream is plaintext HTTP/2 and must stay on a trusted network until that lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c1b9ea1bc2 |
Phase 3 (3/3): wire the control plane to the router
CI / test (push) Successful in 50s
Ready replicas become router endpoints with no static configuration involved. Endpoints that survive an update keep their live state — inflight counts, breaker state, drain rate — so a replica that was already serving does not start from cold because another one moved. The sink is an interface, so when the router and control plane split into separate processes it becomes a watch stream and nothing above it changes. Phase 3's exit criterion now holds end to end. A node hosting a live replica is killed while four clients stream continuously; the control plane marks it unreachable, then lost, rebuilds the replica on a survivor and republishes. Across three runs ~370 requests completed with zero failures and no replica was left on the dead node. This proves the control logic, not the transport: the agent fleet is simulated and the real path still needs the stream. The race detector caught a genuine bug while this went in. startReplica read the replica's fields after publishing it to the map, and scaleUp walked replica pointers outside the lock; both raced with agent status reports, which arrive from another goroutine and mutate exactly those fields. Against the simulated fleet the reports came back fast enough to hit the window on every run. State is snapshotted under the lock now and those functions work from values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dc38dd6096 |
Phase 1.5: admission control
CI / test (push) Successful in 48s
Inserted between quota checks and scheduling: admission answers when a request may proceed, the scheduler still answers where it goes. Keeping them apart is the point — an engine queue is FIFO and knows nothing about tenants, so once a batch job is in it, no endpoint selection rescues the request behind it. - saturation detector: one number per pool, the worse of queue depth and KV occupancy, since either alone misleads. - priority bands with per-band saturation ceilings, so the cluster degrades from the bottom up. - tenant round-robin within a band: one caller sending a thousand requests takes one slot in the rotation, not a thousand. - bounded queues with capacity (503) and TTL (504); cancelled requests leave the queue instead of holding capacity. - metrics for queue depth, wait time, rejections and pool saturation. Exit criterion, measured in test/e2e: with 500 concurrent bronze requests running continuously, interactive p99 in the platinum band stays at 1.04-1.24x idle against a 1.5x budget. With admission off the same load pushes it to 55-60x. Both directions are asserted, so the test fails if admission regresses and also if the load generator stops being a real load. Two lags had to be closed, and they needed different answers. Engine metrics are scraped and lag an interval; router inflight does not, but it counts running requests, and treating those as queue makes a healthy engine look overloaded every interval. What is actually queued is inflight minus batch capacity, and capacity is not in the metric contract, so it is learned as the high-water mark of observed running. Separately, between admission granting a request and the router dispatching it the request is invisible everywhere, so a simultaneous burst passed the check en masse; the controller now counts its own outstanding leases against dispatched inflight. One plan correction: a saturation ceiling of 1.0 was documented as "never held back". It is not — it means "flow up to the healthy limit". A band that must never wait needs a ceiling above 1. Plan §7.2.2 updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a3f71aa5ee |
Phase 1: the router serves traffic
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m1s
llmgw server is real now. It fronts a static set of engine replicas with an OpenAI-compatible API, scoring endpoints through the pipeline added in the previous commit. - proxy: SSE relayed event by event with a flush after each, cancellation propagated upstream, and separate deadlines for dial, headers, first token, inter-token idle and total. The idle watchdog is what distinguishes a wedged engine from a slow one. - router: dispatch with retry and model fallback. Retry only happens while nothing has reached the client; after that, splicing two responses together would be worse than the short stream the client already sees. - config: YAML via koanf overlaid on defaults, with LLMGW_ env overrides. Validation rejects duplicate endpoint ids and aliases that shadow a model, because both misroute silently at request time rather than failing loudly. - metrics: requests, duration, TTFT, tokens, plus per-scorer values and per-filter drops on a separate admin listener with health and pprof. Phase 1 exit criterion, measured in test/e2e: 1000 concurrent streams across 3 sim-engines complete at ~6800 req/s; every client disconnect frees the KV blocks on every engine; router overhead p99 is about 0.9 ms against the plan's 2 ms budget. The handlers live in internal/router rather than an internal/router/openai package as the plan's tree sketched: they need the dispatch loop, and splitting them apart would have meant an interface with exactly one implementation. Plan §4 updated to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b7417e1a69 |
Phase 1 (1/2): scheduler pipeline, endpoint registry, metric scraping
The code behind plan §7.3-7.6: - breaker: folds cooldown and circuit breaking into one component (FailureThreshold=1 gives LiteLLM-style cooldown), with exponential backoff and half-open probes. - endpoint: live state registry. Inflight counting, staleness detection, drain rate derived from counters. A scrape failure does not trip the breaker — the engine may be serving fine while only its metrics endpoint is down. - scrape: parses the §7.6 metric contract. Errors when any of the mandatory three is missing; the metric name mapping is overridable, since names drift between versions (plan §14). - scheduler: the filter -> score -> pick pipeline. A "strategy" is now just a set of scorer weights; chat, batch and long-context are the same code with different weights. Scorers: queue, kv (hard penalty above the ceiling), inflight, load, weight, session (bounded-load consistent hashing). Pickers: max-score, p2c, softmax, round-robin. Decision carries the rationale — which scorer produced what, which filter dropped how many. Tuning the weights without that is guesswork. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |