Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 ebce41e22d Stop calling the PostgreSQL store SQLite, and stop guessing where it is
Two things that were only ever confusing, and one of them stopped a command
working on the cluster.

The store type was named SQLite and kept the name when PostgreSQL was added, so
OpenPostgres returned a *SQLite and all seventy-odd methods on the production
store were spelled after the database it was not running on. Nothing broke;
people did. Earlier today I added three methods to *SQLite for a table that on
this cluster only ever lives in PostgreSQL, and the name did not once look
wrong. It is a field, which is all it ever was.

`llmgw users` and `llmgw keys` defaulted --store to a SQLite path. On a
deployment whose store is PostgreSQL every one of them failed with "unable to
open database file" while the right answer sat in auth.store in the config file
beside them; the conclusion an operator draws is that the tool is broken, and
they are not far off. They now ask the server's own configuration before
falling back, and the error names which of the three sources chose the address
— the failure was never the path, it was which one picked it.

The single-machine default still applies last, so a deployment with no config
file keeps working with no flags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:20:40 +02:00
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 ccc9aa8b76 Route every query through a dialect, before there is a second one
CI / test (push) Successful in 2m30s
Groundwork for PostgreSQL, with no PostgreSQL in it yet: the store still opens
SQLite and behaves exactly as it did.

One set of queries rather than one per database. The SQL here is almost
entirely portable — ON CONFLICT upserts work in both, and the only construct
that genuinely differs is the placeholder — so two copies of every query would
buy nothing and drift, one query at a time, discovered in production.

The rewrite is a wrapper around the handle rather than a change at each call
site. There are sixty of those and sixty chances to forget one; this way the
only route to the driver goes through the rewrite. Making it a wrapper found
six places that reached past it, including all three manual transactions and
two prepared statements — every one of which would have worked on SQLite and
failed on PostgreSQL, on a path nobody exercises before deploying.

The rewriter skips quoted sections. No query here contains a question mark in
a literal today; this is so that adding one is a test failure rather than a
statement that silently binds the wrong argument.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:10:35 +02:00
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 3ed211b2f4 Onboard users with one-time links instead of pasted keys
CI / test (push) Successful in 2m43s
Issuing a key worked; getting it to the person it was issued for did not. The
operator had a secret on their terminal and no way to send it that did not
leave a bearer credential in a chat log forever.

`keys create --claim` prints a link instead. GET shows a button and consumes
nothing; POST reveals the key and burns the link. That split is not politeness
— chat clients, mail scanners and link previewers fetch URLs the moment they
are posted, so a GET that consumed the claim would mean the first thing to
unfurl the link destroys the key before anyone reads it.

A pending claim has to hold the key somewhere, which would otherwise put a
working credential in the database and undo what hashing bought. So the key is
sealed with a key derived from the link's own token, and the token is never
stored — only its hash. A database leak yields two useless hashes and a blob
nothing in the database can open. HKDF rather than the raw token, so the value
used for lookup can never become the value that decrypts.

Consuming is one UPDATE moving claimed_at off NULL, so two people opening the
same link produce one key rather than two copies. A used link, an expired one
and a token that was never real all render identically, because saying which
confirms that a token was once valid. The page is no-store, no-referrer and
noindex: the URL is itself the credential.

`GET /me` reports a key's own limits and spend, so nobody has to ask an
operator to read a dashboard they cannot reach. Outside /v1, because it is not
part of the OpenAI API.

docs/onboarding.md is written for whoever operates this, including the parts
that are deliberately absent — no self-service, no SSO, and why.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 09:11:28 +02:00