A hardened install by default: baseline guardrails with Llama Guard 3 1B judging on a CPU, keys at most 90 days

server init (and the setup screens) write guard.default [baseline] —
secrets refused, cards masked, injection recorded, the judge refusing
S1-S4, S7, S9-S12 in prompts and answers, fail open after 5s — fetch the
judge into the mirror and run it on a node's CPU. --no-guard-model leaves
it out. The closing text names what init cannot do: TLS on the client
port and backup recipients.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 17:45:31 +02:00
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Written for the operator deciding what the gateway lets through: what a
policy can check, what it can do, and how one is attached to a team.
Without a `guard:` section in `server.yaml` nothing is checked and nothing
costs anything. With one, every request is judged once it is authorised and
`llmgw server init` writes a `baseline` policy that applies to every
request, with Llama Guard 3 1B as its judge on a CPU; see
[install.md](install.md#2-the-control-plane) for what it checks. Without a
`guard:` section in `server.yaml` nothing is checked and nothing costs
anything. With one, every request is judged once it is authorised and
within its limits, with its stored conversation spliced in, and before it is
sent to a model; and the answer is judged before the client sees it.