Refuse to open the agent port without TLS unless agent_insecure says so
Without agent_tls the control plane served plaintext h2c on every interface, and any machine reaching it could register as any node. The server now refuses to start that way unless agent_insecure: true, and then binds loopback when agent_listen names only a port. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ agent_listen: ":7443"
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# Mutual TLS on the agent port (plan §5.6). With it, a node's identity is taken
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# from its certificate's common name and an agent claiming a different node id
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# is refused. Without it the port is plaintext HTTP/2 and anyone who can reach
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# it can claim to be any node, so it must stay on a trusted network.
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# is refused. Without it the port would be plaintext HTTP/2 and anyone who can
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# reach it could claim to be any node, so the control plane refuses to start
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# unless `agent_insecure: true` is set — and then listens on loopback unless
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# agent_listen names an address. That is for one machine or a test.
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#
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# These certificates come from llmgw's own authority, not a public one: public
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# authorities stopped issuing the clientAuth usage, so no Let's Encrypt
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