Refuse profile env and args that would run code or touch files on the nodes

env is an allowlist of tuning families less path, plugin, library, address
and credential names (NCCL_*_PLUGIN, CUDA_INJECTION64_PATH and the like
got through the old denylist); llama.cpp's LLAMA_ARG_* are checked as
flags. args refuse --trust-remote-code, --log-file, --slot-save-path,
--tool-parser-plugin, --middleware, --allowed-local-media-path and others
that read, write or load, and what the agent sets itself. Checked in the
catalog and again on the node before an engine starts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 09:54:45 +02:00
1 parent c522e8b2aa
commit c19abe95e1
6 files changed
+241 -21

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@@ -920,6 +920,12 @@ func (a *Agent) startShard(ctx context.Context, m *llmgwv1.StartShard, out chan<
// Validate before launching. An engine that refuses a profile does so after
// minutes of loading; catching it here costs nothing.
// Checked again here, whatever sent the profile: this is the process
// about to run as root.
if err := engines.UnsafeArgs(spec.Profile.Engine, spec.Profile.Args); err != nil {
report(supervisor.Failed, err.Error(), nil)
return
}
if err := eng.Validate(spec.Profile, gpuInfo(inv, spec.GPUIndices)); err != nil {
report(supervisor.Failed, err.Error(), nil)
return