Refuse profile env and args that would run code or touch files on the nodes

env is an allowlist of tuning families less path, plugin, library, address
and credential names (NCCL_*_PLUGIN, CUDA_INJECTION64_PATH and the like
got through the old denylist); llama.cpp's LLAMA_ARG_* are checked as
flags. args refuse --trust-remote-code, --log-file, --slot-save-path,
--tool-parser-plugin, --middleware, --allowed-local-media-path and others
that read, write or load, and what the agent sets itself. Checked in the
catalog and again on the node before an engine starts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 09:54:45 +02:00
1 parent c522e8b2aa
commit c19abe95e1
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@@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ APIs change between minors without a deprecation period.
`agent_insecure: true` is set, and then listens on loopback unless
`agent_listen` names an address. `server init` writes `agent_tls`, as
before.
- **A model definition cannot run code on its nodes.** A profile's `env` and
`args` reach a process the agent runs as root. The environment was checked
against a short denylist that missed NCCL's and CUDA's plugin and
injection libraries; arguments were not checked at all, so
`--trust-remote-code`, llama.cpp's `--log-file` or `--slot-save-path`, or
vLLM's `--tool-parser-plugin` were taken. `env` is now an allowlist of the
families engines are tuned with (CUDA_, NCCL_, VLLM_, OMP_, HF_…) less any
name for a path, plugin, library, address or credential, and llama.cpp's
`LLAMA_ARG_*` are checked as the flags they are; `args` refuse what reads,
writes or loads files, loads code, or moves what the agent sets (host,
port, key, model). Both are refused where a model is defined and again on
the node before the engine starts.
### Everything that can be changed on a running cluster, from the console