Revoke a removed node's certificate, and require --api-client with a mirror's mutual TLS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 10:34:35 +02:00
1 parent fe5b7f88f0
commit 9b61bbc983
16 files changed
+268 -32

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+46 -16
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@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ type Service struct {
// requireIdentity refuses agents that present no certificate. It is off
// only for the insecure development path.
requireIdentity bool
// revokedAt is when a node was removed, whose certificates issued before
// then are refused; nil checks nothing.
revokedAt func(ctx context.Context, nodeID string) (time.Time, error)
mu sync.RWMutex
conns map[string]*conn
@@ -137,6 +140,47 @@ func New(inv *inventory.Store, status StatusSink, requireIdentity bool, log *slo
}
}
// admit decides whether the peer on ctx may be nodeID.
func (s *Service) admit(ctx context.Context, nodeID string) error {
// The certificate decides who this is, not the message.
//
// Without this check an agent could register as any node in the fleet and
// receive that node's shards — which is the same exposure the stream had
// before TLS, just with encryption on top. mTLS is only worth having if the
// identity it proves is the one actually used.
if peer := peerFrom(ctx); peer.Verified {
if peer.CommonName != nodeID {
s.log.Warn("rejecting an agent claiming a node id its certificate does not authorize",
"certificate_cn", peer.CommonName, "claimed", nodeID)
return connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied,
fmt.Errorf("certificate authorizes node %q, not %q", peer.CommonName, nodeID))
}
if s.revokedAt != nil {
at, err := s.revokedAt(ctx, nodeID)
if err != nil {
// Unknown is not "not revoked": the agent retries.
return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("checking revocation: %w", err))
}
if !at.IsZero() && !peer.IssuedAt.After(at) {
s.log.Warn("rejecting a removed node's certificate", "node", nodeID,
"issued", peer.IssuedAt, "removed", at)
return connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, fmt.Errorf(
"node %q was removed from the cluster, and its certificate with it; onboard it again", nodeID))
}
}
} else if s.requireIdentity {
return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated,
errors.New("no verified client certificate"))
}
return nil
}
// SetRevocations has agents refused whose certificate was issued before
// their node was removed.
func (s *Service) SetRevocations(f func(ctx context.Context, nodeID string) (time.Time, error)) {
s.revokedAt = f
}
// Handler returns the HTTP path and handler to mount.
//
// The handler is wrapped so the verified client identity reaches the stream:
@@ -182,22 +226,8 @@ func (s *Service) Connect(
return connect.NewError(connect.CodeInvalidArgument, errors.New("node_id is required"))
}
// The certificate decides who this is, not the message.
//
// Without this check an agent could register as any node in the fleet and
// receive that node's shards — which is the same exposure the stream had
// before TLS, just with encryption on top. mTLS is only worth having if the
// identity it proves is the one actually used.
if peer := peerFrom(ctx); peer.Verified {
if peer.CommonName != nodeID {
s.log.Warn("rejecting an agent claiming a node id its certificate does not authorize",
"certificate_cn", peer.CommonName, "claimed", nodeID)
return connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied,
fmt.Errorf("certificate authorizes node %q, not %q", peer.CommonName, nodeID))
}
} else if s.requireIdentity {
return connect.NewError(connect.CodeUnauthenticated,
errors.New("no verified client certificate"))
if err := s.admit(ctx, nodeID); err != nil {
return err
}
node := NodeFromRegister(reg)