A sign-in through the identity provider may end on either control plane

The cookie that carries a sign-in across the provider was signed with a
key each process made for itself, so with two control planes behind a
balancer a callback reaching the other one was refused as tampered — half
of all sign-ins. The key is now the store's oidc-state secret, sealed like
the others and the same on every control plane.

Changelog: the fixes since v0.14.2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-10 11:33:41 +02:00
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@@ -386,10 +386,9 @@ portal is not done — the page shows; the console and ctl change.
tenant-admin / billing; `ctl audit`. Depends on A5 for a real actor.
2. **Done (branch `features-c`):** OIDC sign-in (`auth.oidc`, PKCE,
verified email, roles and memberships from groups, `no_passwords`) and
SCIM 2.0 (`/scim/v2` Users and Groups). Left: the sign-in cookie is
signed with a per-process key, so with two control planes behind a
balancer the callback must reach the one that started it (sticky
sessions) until the key comes from the store. **OIDC/SSO login (M), then SCIM (M).** `internal/account/service.go`,
SCIM 2.0 (`/scim/v2` Users and Groups). The sign-in cookie's key comes
from the store (2026-10-10), so a callback may reach either control
plane behind a balancer. **OIDC/SSO login (M), then SCIM (M).** `internal/account/service.go`,
`internal/web/account.go`; map IdP groups to org/team/admin.
3. **Done (branch `features-c`):** key lifetime limits (gateway, org, team,
project), `keys rotate --overlap`, kinds and expiry in `keys list`.