Files
llmgw/internal/router/chat.go
T
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 45d0dee470 Let a reply full of code be downloaded as a zip
Asking a coding model for anything real produces a small tree, and the only
way to get it out of the page was to select each block and paste it
somewhere. A reply containing fenced code now offers a zip, with the
directory structure the model described.

Server-side, because the interesting part is the filenames. They are written
by a language model and they go into an archive that somebody extracts with
a tool that trusts archives, so "../../.ssh/authorized_keys" and
"/etc/cron.d/x" are inputs to expect rather than hope against. archive/zip
and a sanitiser with tests beat string handling in a browser. An absolute
path is made relative — it cannot escape once the leading separator is gone,
and refusing a file over a leading slash throws away work. Anything that
still escapes after cleaning is rejected rather than repaired, because
silently turning ../../evil.go into evil.go puts a file somewhere the reader
did not expect; it gets a generated name instead.

Naming follows what models actually do: on the fence (```go:cmd/main.go,
```main.go, ```go main.go, title="x"), or on the line above it as a heading
or comment. Only the two lines immediately above, so a sentence mentioning
main.go is not read as a filename. A block nobody named still comes back
under a generated name, because losing code because it was unlabelled is
worse than naming it badly, and two blocks claiming one path both survive —
models show a file and then show it again with one line changed.

Nothing is stored: the reply arrives, the zip goes back, neither is kept.
The endpoint sits behind the same session guard and CSRF check as
/chat/send.

Two of these tests asserted the wrong thing when first written — that an
absolute path must be refused, and that hyphens are stripped from the
archive name. Both were corrected to what the code should do rather than
the code changed to match them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 21:06:07 +02:00

166 lines
5.8 KiB
Go

package router
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strings"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/auth"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/store"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/version"
"gitea.mynodes.xyz/ilker/llmgw/internal/web"
)
// registerChat mounts the in-browser chat for signed-in people.
//
// It exists so someone can try a model without setting up a client, and — more
// often — so they can tell whether a problem is the gateway or their code.
//
// The browser never sees an API key. The page carries a session, the server
// turns that into the same identity an API key would produce, and the request
// goes down the ordinary path: admission, model allowlist, rate limits, budget,
// accounting. Anything else would make this page a hole in every limit the rest
// of the gateway enforces.
func (r *Router) registerChat(mux *http.ServeMux, pages *web.AccountPages) {
mux.HandleFunc("GET /chat", pages.Guard(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, user store.User) {
web.Chat(user, r.modelsFor(req, user), version.Version)(w, req)
}))
mux.HandleFunc("POST /chat/send", pages.Guard(r.chatSend))
// Behind the same guard as the rest of the page: it takes a POST body and
// returns a file, so it wants a session and the CSRF check for the same
// reasons /chat/send does.
mux.HandleFunc("POST /chat/download", pages.Guard(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, _ store.User) {
web.CodeArchive(r.cfg.MaxBodyBytes)(w, req)
}))
}
// chatSend dispatches one turn on behalf of a signed-in person.
func (r *Router) chatSend(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, user store.User) {
principal, err := r.principalFor(req, user)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "your account has no project to bill this to", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(req.Body, r.cfg.MaxBodyBytes))
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "could not read the request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
var in struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
Messages []json.RawMessage `json:"messages"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &in); err != nil || in.Model == "" || len(in.Messages) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "a model and at least one message are required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Rebuilt rather than forwarded, so the page cannot set fields it has no
// business setting — a stream:false that would hang the reader, a
// max_tokens large enough to occupy a replica for an hour.
upstream, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"model": in.Model,
"messages": in.Messages,
"stream": true,
"max_tokens": chatMaxTokens,
})
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "could not build the request", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
next := req.Clone(auth.WithPrincipal(req.Context(), principal))
next.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(upstream))
next.ContentLength = int64(len(upstream))
next.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
// The same handler the API serves, so there is exactly one request path and
// no second place for its rules to drift.
r.handleInference("/v1/chat/completions")(w, next)
}
// chatMaxTokens bounds one turn from the page.
//
// A playground should not be the thing that ties up a replica for ten minutes,
// and someone who wants a longer answer has an API key for that.
//
// 512 was chosen when every model here was a 0.5B answering questions in a
// paragraph. It is about a screenful of code, so a coding model cut off
// mid-function on the first real request — and the page said nothing, because
// it never read finish_reason. The cap being too low was a nuisance; the reply
// ending silently was the actual defect, and both are fixed.
const chatMaxTokens = 2048
// principalFor builds the identity a signed-in person acts under.
//
// The key id is synthetic and marked as a session, because there is no key: it
// keeps usage rows attributable and rate limits per person, while making it
// obvious in the usage table that these requests came from the page rather than
// from a credential somebody holds.
func (r *Router) principalFor(req *http.Request, user store.User) (auth.Principal, error) {
if r.store == nil || user.ProjectID == "" {
return auth.Principal{}, errors.New("no project")
}
eff, err := r.store.ResolveProject(req.Context(), user.ProjectID)
if err != nil {
return auth.Principal{}, err
}
return auth.Principal{
KeyID: "session:" + user.ID,
KeyPrefix: "session",
ProjectID: eff.ProjectID,
TeamID: eff.TeamID,
OrgID: eff.OrgID,
Band: eff.Band,
RoutingProfile: eff.RoutingProfile,
Limits: eff,
}, nil
}
// modelsFor lists what this person may actually ask for.
//
// Served rather than catalogued: offering a model with no replica produces a
// 503 the reader cannot interpret, and the allowlist is applied so the picker
// never shows a model the request would refuse.
//
// Real models are ordered ahead of simulated ones so the browser's default
// selection — the first option — is always a model that answers. Sorted purely
// by name, "big-model" came first and every visitor who pressed Send without
// touching the picker got placeholder text.
func (r *Router) modelsFor(req *http.Request, user store.User) []web.ChatModel {
principal, err := r.principalFor(req, user)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
seen := map[string]struct{}{}
var out []web.ChatModel
for _, s := range r.reg.Snapshots("") {
for _, m := range s.Models {
if _, dup := seen[m]; dup {
continue
}
seen[m] = struct{}{}
if r.permits(principal, m) {
out = append(out, web.ChatModel{Name: m, Simulated: r.models[m].Simulated()})
}
}
}
slices.SortFunc(out, func(a, b web.ChatModel) int {
if a.Simulated != b.Simulated {
if b.Simulated {
return -1
}
return 1
}
return strings.Compare(a.Name, b.Name)
})
return out
}