Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 082d52bc97 Stop shipping a placeholder that looks like a value, and say what is served
A user copied the curl from the profile page and sent it as it stood. Every
other field in that snippet is filled in for them — the base URL, the key
they had just been issued — so "model": "MODEL" reads as a value rather
than a blank, and they got:

  no endpoint serves "MODEL"

which is true and useless. It reads the same whether the name was a typo,
a placeholder left in from the documentation, or a real outage, and it
never says what would have worked.

The message now lists what is being served, capped at ten with a count for
the rest, and says plainly when nothing is. That list is what /v1/models
already returns to the same caller, so it discloses nothing new.

The profile page's example now names a model that is actually running,
real ones before simulated — the point of an example someone can run is
that it runs, and sending a first request to the sim engine would answer
in Greek letters. The landing and claim pages keep a placeholder, because
they are served without a key and deliberately say nothing about what is
here; theirs is <model-name>, which cannot be mistaken for a value, with a
line saying where to get the real one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 18:23:19 +02:00
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 79e459d9ff Let people change their own password, and operators reset a lost one
The account system shipped without either, which made the first forgotten
password an unanswerable support request.

Changing it requires the current one. A session is what an attacker gets from
a borrowed laptop or a stolen cookie; the password is what they do not have,
and without the check the first thing they would do is take the account.

Every session is closed, including the browser doing the changing — leaving
the others open would mean a password change does nothing about the reason
someone is changing it. A new session is then opened for the browser in front
of us, so the person who just proved their password is not thrown back to the
sign-in page. That response also carries a new CSRF cookie, so the forms it
renders take the new token rather than the one the request arrived with; there
is a test that posts a form from that exact page.

Guessing the current password is bounded the same way sign-in is, because
someone holding a stolen session should not get unlimited attempts at the
password that would let them keep it.

There is no self-service reset: this gateway sends no email, and a reset link
with nowhere to send it is not a reset. `llmgw users reset-password` is the
operator's answer, and it closes their sessions too — if someone lost their
password, the reason might be that somebody else has it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 09:39:11 +02:00
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5 216fc9bb03 Let people sign up, be approved, and issue their own keys
Every key needed an operator with a shell. This adds the login system that
made that necessary, which is the thing I argued against building until it was
asked for — so it is built as if it will be attacked, because a public login
form is.

Signing up produces an account that can do nothing. Approval is what makes it
work and stays on the CLI: having a shell on the control plane is what makes
someone an administrator, and that is a smaller thing to get right than roles
and an admin UI that mints credentials.

The details that matter:

Passwords are argon2id, where a slow hash is correct — the input is chosen by
a human and has a dictionary, which is the opposite of an API key. Both kinds
of authentication now live in this codebase and they are in separate packages
so neither set of assumptions leaks into the other. Length is the only rule:
composition rules push people towards Password1! and cost more entropy than
they buy.

Signup never says whether an address already has an account, and sign-in
answers the same way for a wrong password and a missing account — verifying
against a dummy hash when there is no user, so a stopwatch cannot enumerate
accounts. Account state is checked after the password, not before, so guessing
an address reveals nothing about it. Guessing is bounded per address rather
than per IP: an attacker has many addresses to come from and one to guess
against, and limiting by IP locks out an office behind one NAT.

Sessions are server-side, so signing out and suspending take effect
immediately rather than whenever a token expires; suspension is checked in the
same query that resolves the session, because a second round trip is a check
somebody eventually forgets. Every state-changing form carries a CSRF token
verified against a hash in the session — a cookie authenticates the browser,
not the page that asked.

Key ownership is enforced in the UPDATE rather than by reading first, so a
guessed key id from another account changes nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 09:32:35 +02:00