These TRUNCATE every table before each test. Pointed at a deployment that is a
silent and complete data loss — every key, every user, every conversation.
Not hypothetical. I did it: an SSH tunnel to the production database had been
opened minutes earlier for a perfectly good reason, and the same DSN was then
handed to the test suite. Twenty-one users, nine API keys, eighteen sessions,
four hundred and sixty-one usage records and three runtime-added models, gone
between one command and the next. Recovered only because the pre-migration
SQLite file was still there.
The guard is the database name. A test database has to say so, because a check
that could be satisfied by accident would not have stopped this one — the DSN
was entirely correct for what it had been opened for, and catastrophic for
what it was then used for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first thing HA needs that a shared store does not give. Two control planes
against one store both reconcile: both see a model wanting two replicas and
none running, and both place. The model ends up with twice what it asked for,
each replica holding GPUs the other's inventory believes are free — and nothing
crashes to say so.
A lease in a table rather than a lock held by a connection. PostgreSQL has
advisory locks and SQLite has nothing like them, and this store keeps one set
of queries for both; a row with an expiry works everywhere, and it survives a
leader being powered off rather than asked to stop, which is the case that
matters. Taking and renewing are the same statement, so the two cannot disagree
about what a held lease looks like, and it is one statement, so two processes
racing cannot both believe they won.
The owner id is random rather than the hostname. A hostname would let a
restarted process match its own stale lease and believe it had been leading all
along — including through the gap that made it restart, during which somebody
else may have taken over and started placing.
A store that cannot be reached is not evidence that somebody else is leading,
so an unreachable store keeps the claim. Two leaders is worse than one, but no
leader means nothing is placed and nothing is evicted, and a brief database
blip should not stop a cluster healing itself.
Unset means leader. Every deployment that existed before this, every
single-control-plane install and every test acts unconditionally, with nothing
to configure.
The same seven assertions run against both backends, which is how the test
harness was caught inheriting a lease between subtests — it passed on SQLite,
where each subtest gets a fresh file, and failed only on PostgreSQL.
What this does not yet do is move agents. A standby holding an agent's stream
is one the leader cannot command, so failover is degraded rather than clean
until agents know more than one address.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keys are stored hashed, so a migration that drops them cannot recreate them:
every person and every script needs a new one issued, and the old ones cannot
even be looked up to say which they were. `llmgw keys move-store` copies
instead.
Found by running it against the real cluster, twice, after the gateway had
already been stopped.
The first order came from the order the migrations create tables in, and
users is created in a later migration than api_keys even though api_keys
references it — so the copy died three tables in. The order is now checked by
a test that derives the foreign keys from the migrations rather than restating
them, so a new reference fails there instead of during somebody's migration.
Checked by putting the wrong order back and watching it fail.
Then key_claims. Its sealed column is emptied the moment a claim is used, so
every claimed row holds an empty blob in a NOT NULL column. An empty blob
scans as a typed nil slice and a genuine NULL as an untyped one — a
distinction this side can see and pgx cannot, since it encodes any nil slice
as NULL. Restored before the insert, which is the difference between a copy
that completes and one that stops four tables in.
One transaction per table rather than one for the whole copy: a single
transaction holding every row of a large usage table is how a migration runs
out of memory on the machine least able to spare it. A failure therefore
leaves a partial copy, which is why the destination must have been empty —
starting again is dropping and recreating it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A path is still SQLite and a postgres:// URL is PostgreSQL, so every existing
configuration keeps working untouched and moving is one line changed rather
than a new setting to find. An address of the form @/path/to/file reads the
real one out of that file, which is how a DSN carrying a password stays out of
a configuration that gets copied, diffed and pasted into issues.
The driver is pgx, which is pure Go. That is not a preference: the whole binary
is built with CGO_ENABLED=0 so it runs on a node whose libc is older than the
builder's, and a cgo driver would take that away from every deployment,
including the ones still on SQLite.
Tested against a real PostgreSQL, which found two things nothing else could.
The schema_migrations table is created in Go rather than in a migration file,
so it escaped the port and still said INTEGER — 64 bits in SQLite, 32 in
PostgreSQL, and a millisecond timestamp does not fit, so the very first
migration failed to record that it had run. And the memory migration uses an
FTS5 virtual table with three triggers keeping it in step, which has no
counterpart: PostgreSQL derives a tsvector from the row, so there is nothing
to keep in step and no trigger to forget.
That leaves exactly one query that is not the same sentence in both dialects —
the note search, MATCH against @@ — and it is written out twice rather than
hidden behind a shared spelling that would mean something subtly different in
each. Everything else is one set of queries.
The text search uses the 'simple' configuration rather than English. These are
an agent's own notes, in whatever language it chose, and stemming English
rules over Turkish would quietly stop finding things.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Groundwork for PostgreSQL, with no PostgreSQL in it yet: the store still opens
SQLite and behaves exactly as it did.
One set of queries rather than one per database. The SQL here is almost
entirely portable — ON CONFLICT upserts work in both, and the only construct
that genuinely differs is the placeholder — so two copies of every query would
buy nothing and drift, one query at a time, discovered in production.
The rewrite is a wrapper around the handle rather than a change at each call
site. There are sixty of those and sixty chances to forget one; this way the
only route to the driver goes through the rewrite. Making it a wrapper found
six places that reached past it, including all three manual transactions and
two prepared statements — every one of which would have worked on SQLite and
failed on PostgreSQL, on a path nobody exercises before deploying.
The rewriter skips quoted sections. No query here contains a question mark in
a literal today; this is so that adding one is a test failure rather than a
statement that silently binds the wrong argument.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The storage half of continuing a thread on a different model than it started
on. Nothing uses it yet.
Until now llmgw stored no message content anywhere: usage rows carry token
counts, costs and latencies, never text, and even its own chat page keeps the
conversation in a JavaScript variable that a refresh discards. That property
is worth more than the feature, so it is the default and stays the default.
A project stores nothing until someone turns it on for that project.
Retention is a number of hours rather than a boolean, because a thread store
with no expiry is a transcript of everything a team ever typed, kept forever
because nobody chose a number. Turning it on means saying for how long. The
window measures idleness rather than age — expiring a conversation someone is
still having would be a strange way to keep that promise.
Threads are scoped to a project and the scope is part of every lookup, not a
check afterwards. Reading a thread from another project and reading one that
does not exist return the same error: two errors would let a caller learn
which ids are real in projects they cannot read. Writing across projects is
refused for the same reason in the other direction — append, then read your
own reply back.
Deleting a thread takes its messages with it, which the test checks by
counting rows rather than by trusting the cascade. Someone has to be able to
say "forget that", and a retention window is no answer to a message sent by
mistake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dashboard could say what the cluster was made of and not who was
spending it. Usage was per key, which is the right unit for revoking
something and the wrong one for the question actually being asked: one
person holds a laptop key, a CI key and a notebook key, and adding three
rows up by eye is a chore that gets skipped.
Per person now, joined through the keys they own, and per model — counted
by the model that answered rather than the one requested, since those differ
whenever a fallback serves and what actually ran is the question. Headline
figures are stat tiles with a sparkline: a single current value is a number,
and plotting one is how a chart ends up with a single bar in it. The
sparkline says only rising, falling or flat, which is the one thing the
number cannot.
Ranked horizontal bars, because the labels are email addresses and model
names and the label is the point — the question is which person, not what
shape the distribution has. Rotated or truncated axis labels say the chart
matters more than reading it. Trimmed where drawn and complete on hover, so
the plot keeps its geometry and a reader can still find out whose row it is.
The palette is validated rather than chosen: every adjacent pair clears the
colour-vision separation threshold, and the dark values are the same hues
re-stepped for the dark surface instead of an automatic flip. Run through a
validator, because that is the only way anyone can honestly claim a palette
is colourblind-safe.
Which turned up a bug in the existing chart code. cssVar is an allowlist of
four names that silently returns --accent for anything else, and callers
wrap it in var() themselves — so every new series would have rendered in one
colour with accent-coloured text. Caught by a test written from the rule
that chart text wears text tokens, never the series colour.
A key with no owner is labelled "operator-issued keys" rather than unknown:
it predates accounts and is doing its job, and "unknown" would imply
something is wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The catalog can change while the cluster runs; this is where a change goes
so it is still there tomorrow. Models declared in configuration and models
added at runtime are two sources on purpose: config-as-code stays
declarative and under review, and the database holds what someone added to
try it.
Configuration wins every conflict, and the direction matters. A request for
a reviewed production model must never be answered by something added from
a laptop, so a stored model colliding with a declared name is refused when
it is added. A declared model cannot be removed at runtime either — it
would return on the next restart, leaving the cluster disagreeing with its
own config file until then, which is a worse answer than refusing and
saying where to edit.
The whole catalog is built before anything is written. A model naming a
missing fallback, or colliding, or malformed in any of the ways catalog.New
refuses, is rejected rather than persisted and then skipped forever after —
a model that looks added and never appears is the worst outcome available.
Removal is checked the same way, because another model may fall back to the
one being removed, and a fallback pointing at nothing is discovered during
the outage it was meant to cover.
At startup each stored model is validated on its own against what is
already accepted, so one bad row is skipped and named rather than taking
the cluster with it. The declared models are precisely the ones that must
survive that.
Catalog types now carry json tags mirroring their koanf ones, so a stored
definition is the same shape as the YAML someone writes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unlimited was the default. Creating a project without limits is the easy
path and the common one — the "default" project on this cluster is one, and
the person using it is metered by nothing at all. The first sign of that is
the bill or the outage.
auth.default_rpm and default_tpm now apply to a key no scope gives a limit
to. Zero keeps the old behaviour, which is still a reasonable choice; the
point is that it becomes a choice rather than an omission.
Applied after the chain rather than folded in as its widest scope, because
a default is a fallback and not a ceiling: a project deliberately given 600
rpm must keep it, and tightening would silently cap it at the default. An
explicit limit wins in both directions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
So someone can try a model without setting up a client, and — more often —
tell whether a problem is the gateway or their code.
The page carries a session, and the server turns that into the identity an API
key would have produced, resolved from the person's project. The request then
goes down the ordinary path by being handed to the same handler /v1 uses:
admission, model allowlist, rate limits, budget, accounting. There is exactly
one request path, so there is no second place for its rules to drift — and
without that, a playground is a hole in every limit the rest of the gateway
enforces. The allowlist test posts a forbidden model and expects 403 for that
reason.
The body is rebuilt rather than forwarded, so the page cannot set fields it has
no business setting: a stream:false that would hang the reader, a max_tokens
large enough to occupy a replica for an hour. One turn is capped at 512 tokens.
The picker offers what is actually served and allowed, not what is catalogued,
because offering a model with no replica produces a 503 the reader cannot
interpret.
Inline vanilla JavaScript, for the same reason the charts are hand-drawn SVG.
It streams, because on CPU inference ten seconds is normal and a chat that
hangs and then dumps a paragraph feels broken. Replies are written with
textContent throughout: model output and user input have no business being
parsed as markup. Its POSTs carry the CSRF token in a header, which a
cross-site form cannot set at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two things the dashboard was missing: it could not act, and it was a column of
numbers.
Account administration moves to /admin/users — approving into a project,
suspending, reinstating. That is the work an operator does constantly and it
should not need a terminal. Three things stay on the CLI, and the line is not
arbitrary: promoting someone to admin, resetting a password, and issuing a key
on another person's behalf each turn a stolen admin session into more than it
was — permanent access, or somebody else's account. Approving and suspending
do not. Suspending signs the account out everywhere, or suspension is advisory
until the session happens to expire, and an admin cannot suspend themselves,
which is not a thing an interface should let you do by misclicking.
The charts are inline SVG generated in Go. A charting library would mean a
JavaScript toolchain in CI and a megabyte of bundle for what is a list of
rectangles, and the single-binary goal rules that out. Hourly over a day: fine
enough to show a working day, coarse enough that one slow minute is not an
incident. Empty hours are filled in, because a chart with hours missing where
nothing happened reads as a chart with hours missing from the data.
The SVG is marked as trusted HTML, so everything that reaches it is either a
number this package computed or escaped explicitly, and a bar's colour can only
be one of four names — a colour that could be anything is a way to write CSS
into every page the chart appears on. There are tests for both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reaching it meant an SSH tunnel, because the page lived on the admin listener
and that listener is bound to loopback. Opening the port was never the way to
fix that: it also serves pprof, and pprof can dump the process heap, where
every API key sits in plaintext. Exposing the port would have been exposing
the key store.
So the page moves rather than the port. The same dashboard is now mounted at
/admin on the client-facing port, behind the session and CSRF machinery that
already guards /profile, gated on a flag on the account. The admin listener
keeps pprof and metrics and stays on loopback.
One bit, not a role system: it grants looking. Everything that changes the
cluster or issues a credential stays on the CLI, where it needs a shell rather
than a session — which keeps the worst case of a stolen admin cookie to "saw
the cluster" rather than "drained your fleet".
Someone without the flag gets 404, not 403. A 403 confirms the page is there
and that admin accounts exist here, which is free reconnaissance; 404 is what
every other unknown path returns. The profile page does not show a link to a
door the visitor cannot open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The account system shipped without either, which made the first forgotten
password an unanswerable support request.
Changing it requires the current one. A session is what an attacker gets from
a borrowed laptop or a stolen cookie; the password is what they do not have,
and without the check the first thing they would do is take the account.
Every session is closed, including the browser doing the changing — leaving
the others open would mean a password change does nothing about the reason
someone is changing it. A new session is then opened for the browser in front
of us, so the person who just proved their password is not thrown back to the
sign-in page. That response also carries a new CSRF cookie, so the forms it
renders take the new token rather than the one the request arrived with; there
is a test that posts a form from that exact page.
Guessing the current password is bounded the same way sign-in is, because
someone holding a stolen session should not get unlimited attempts at the
password that would let them keep it.
There is no self-service reset: this gateway sends no email, and a reset link
with nowhere to send it is not a reset. `llmgw users reset-password` is the
operator's answer, and it closes their sessions too — if someone lost their
password, the reason might be that somebody else has it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every key needed an operator with a shell. This adds the login system that
made that necessary, which is the thing I argued against building until it was
asked for — so it is built as if it will be attacked, because a public login
form is.
Signing up produces an account that can do nothing. Approval is what makes it
work and stays on the CLI: having a shell on the control plane is what makes
someone an administrator, and that is a smaller thing to get right than roles
and an admin UI that mints credentials.
The details that matter:
Passwords are argon2id, where a slow hash is correct — the input is chosen by
a human and has a dictionary, which is the opposite of an API key. Both kinds
of authentication now live in this codebase and they are in separate packages
so neither set of assumptions leaks into the other. Length is the only rule:
composition rules push people towards Password1! and cost more entropy than
they buy.
Signup never says whether an address already has an account, and sign-in
answers the same way for a wrong password and a missing account — verifying
against a dummy hash when there is no user, so a stopwatch cannot enumerate
accounts. Account state is checked after the password, not before, so guessing
an address reveals nothing about it. Guessing is bounded per address rather
than per IP: an attacker has many addresses to come from and one to guess
against, and limiting by IP locks out an office behind one NAT.
Sessions are server-side, so signing out and suspending take effect
immediately rather than whenever a token expires; suspension is checked in the
same query that resolves the session, because a second round trip is a check
somebody eventually forgets. Every state-changing form carries a CSRF token
verified against a hash in the session — a cookie authenticates the browser,
not the page that asked.
Key ownership is enforced in the UPDATE rather than by reading first, so a
guessed key id from another account changes nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issuing a key worked; getting it to the person it was issued for did not. The
operator had a secret on their terminal and no way to send it that did not
leave a bearer credential in a chat log forever.
`keys create --claim` prints a link instead. GET shows a button and consumes
nothing; POST reveals the key and burns the link. That split is not politeness
— chat clients, mail scanners and link previewers fetch URLs the moment they
are posted, so a GET that consumed the claim would mean the first thing to
unfurl the link destroys the key before anyone reads it.
A pending claim has to hold the key somewhere, which would otherwise put a
working credential in the database and undo what hashing bought. So the key is
sealed with a key derived from the link's own token, and the token is never
stored — only its hash. A database leak yields two useless hashes and a blob
nothing in the database can open. HKDF rather than the raw token, so the value
used for lookup can never become the value that decrypts.
Consuming is one UPDATE moving claimed_at off NULL, so two people opening the
same link produce one key rather than two copies. A used link, an expired one
and a token that was never real all render identically, because saying which
confirms that a token was once valid. The page is no-store, no-referrer and
noindex: the URL is itself the credential.
`GET /me` reports a key's own limits and spend, so nobody has to ask an
operator to read a dashboard they cannot reach. Outside /v1, because it is not
part of the OpenAI API.
docs/onboarding.md is written for whoever operates this, including the parts
that are deliberately absent — no self-service, no SSO, and why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SQLite creates its file with the process umask, which on a stock system means
every account on the machine can read it. What is in there is not a working
credential — keys are stored hashed — but it is the whole tenancy tree and
every request anyone made, and that should not depend on an operator
remembering to chmod it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pasting the gateway's address into a browser returned 404, which looks like a
broken endpoint rather than one that tells you how to use it.
Two pages, and the split between them is a security boundary rather than a
layout choice. The landing page is served without a key — it has to be,
because the person reading it is the one who does not have one yet — so it
contains no data at all: it says how to connect, not what is here. Model names
stay behind /v1/models. It reconstructs the address from the forwarded headers
so the copy-pasteable example names the address the client actually used
rather than the internal one; those headers are reflected into displayed text
and never used for a decision.
The dashboard shows nodes, models, replicas, placement failures and usage, and
lives on the admin listener only. That listener is loopback-bound and also
serves pprof, which can dump the process heap — where API keys sit in
plaintext — so reaching the page from elsewhere is an SSH tunnel's job. It is
read-only: anything that mints a credential stays in `llmgw keys`, where it
needs a shell rather than a browser session this project has no way to
authenticate.
Mounting the landing page uncovered a hole in the exemption list. An entry
ending in "/" was a prefix rule, and "/" ends in "/", so exempting the landing
page would have exempted every path there is — authentication still installed,
still logging, and letting the whole API through. "/" is now exact, with a
test enumerating what must and must not be exempt.
Server-rendered templates and one stylesheet, embedded. The single-binary goal
rules out a JavaScript toolchain and nothing on either page needs one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 5 begins. This is the persistence layer for the things the cluster
cannot reconstruct — who may call, what they are allowed, what they used.
Everything else llmgw knows is still derived from the fleet, which cannot be
wrong about itself the way a database can (§6.5).
SQLite behind an interface. The plan justified that by write volume, which was
the wrong argument: the write path is batched anyway, and a 500-row
transaction every 200ms is nothing for either engine. The real argument is the
failure mode. Postgres is a second service, and a gateway that stops serving
because its accounting database is unreachable is worse than one that buffers
some accounting. Embedded means the store shares the gateway's fate instead of
adding an independent way to be down. That reasoning stops holding at two
instances, where budgets have to be counted somewhere shared — so the
interface is here from the start, the SQL is portable, and migrations are per
dialect with shared version numbers.
Keys are stored as sha256 and nothing else, so a database leak hands over no
working credential. The fast hash is deliberate: the input is 256 random bits
with no dictionary to attack, so argon2 would buy nothing and charge tens of
milliseconds per request. That assumption is written down next to the code
that depends on it.
Two things the schema now says that it did not: budgets are integer
micro-units, because repeated addition of floats drifts; and an empty model
allowlist forbids everything while an absent one permits everything, which the
resolver has to keep distinct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>