Document TLS between the store's machines, and close section A of the backlog

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 12:12:35 +02:00
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@@ -19,20 +19,13 @@ Conventions this codebase keeps, which every item here must keep too:
## A. Security — do first
**Status (2026-10-04, branch `security-a`):** done — A1, A2, A3, A4, A5
(token on loopback rather than a unix socket), A6 except the item below, A7,
A8, A9. **Left:**
- **A6b** — etcd client/peer TLS with `--client-cert-auth`, and Patroni's
REST API over TLS, for new clusters and as a rolling change for running
ones. Until then the firewall (A9) keeps 2379/2380/8008 to the cluster's
networks and Patroni's API asks for a password.
- From A8: thread ids are bounded and documented as project-wide, but not
scoped per user; Python engines are resolved with an explicit PyTorch
index and a PEP 751 lock, but locks are not shipped per engine version.
- A9 is live on the PoC (140, 149, 150, 148): llmgw's ports answer
10.0.0.0/24, are dropped from outside it (tested over IPv6), and ssh,
:8080 and other services are untouched. The other nodes get it on their
next `node add`.
**Status (2026-10-04): done and merged.** A1–A9, A6b included — etcd and
Patroni's API on TLS, the PoC moved in maintenance mode without a failover.
Deliberately narrower than written: the admin API is a token on loopback
rather than a unix socket (A5); thread ids are bounded and documented as
project-wide rather than scoped per user (A8); Python engines resolve with an
explicit PyTorch index and a PEP 751 lock rather than locks shipped per engine
version (A8). All of A is live on the PoC.
### A1. Toolchain (S, hours)
`govulncheck` finds 11 standard-library vulnerabilities reachable from this