Refuse to open the agent port without TLS unless agent_insecure says so

Without agent_tls the control plane served plaintext h2c on every
interface, and any machine reaching it could register as any node. The
server now refuses to start that way unless agent_insecure: true, and then
binds loopback when agent_listen names only a port.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 09:51:37 +02:00
1 parent 0bd5305e9a
commit c522e8b2aa
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@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ rather than repeated.
| `threads` | `Threads` | [Server](#server) |
| `landing` | `Landing` | [Server](#server) |
| `agent_tls` | `tlsconf.Config` | [Server](#server) |
| `agent_insecure` | `bool` | [Server](#server) |
| `monitoring` | `Monitoring` | [Server](#server) |
| `tracing` | `Tracing` | [Server](#server) |
| `mirror` | `Mirror` | [Server](#server) |
@@ -1376,6 +1377,18 @@ trusted certificate, while this one is mutual and private.
Takes a [tlsconf.Config](#tlsconfconfig) block.
### `agent_insecure`
`bool`
AgentInsecure lets a control plane run its agent port without
agent_tls: plaintext, and any machine that reaches it may register as
any node — be given replicas, and so be sent users' prompts — or, in
the other direction, a machine in the path may tell every agent what
to run. Refused unless said here, and then the port listens on
loopback unless agent_listen names an address. For one machine, a
test, or a network nothing untrusted reaches.
### `monitoring`
`Monitoring`