Console: rotate a key, cap key lifetimes, test the webhooks; README, onboarding and console docs caught up
The README's status stopped at v0.9 and listed gaps since closed; onboarding still said there was no SSO and no roles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ and power, and each model's requests a second. The history comes from the
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Prometheus named by `monitoring.prometheus` in server.yaml; without one the
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charts draw what this console has seen since it opened, and say so. Network
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and disk come from each machine's node exporter, which `llmgw node add`
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installs. A node's and a model's own pages have their charts too, over the
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installs. **N** sends a test notification to each webhook in server.yaml's
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`notify` section and says how each answered (`llmgw ctl notify test`). A node's and a model's own pages have their charts too, over the
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same range.
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**Nodes** lists every node with its state, load, GPUs, replicas, disk and
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@@ -158,7 +159,9 @@ project, their limits, a new password (their sessions close), delete.
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**API keys** — every key, its project, owner, state and last use. **A**
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issues one; the key is shown once, in the result, and never again. On a row:
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its limits, or revoke it.
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its limits, **Rotate…** — a new key with the same project, owner and limits,
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the old one working on for the overlap you give (`llmgw keys rotate`) — or
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revoke it.
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**Accounts** rows also have **Staff role…**:
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- `viewer` looks at every page under /admin and changes nothing;
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@@ -182,8 +185,10 @@ with anything secret taken out. `llmgw ctl audit` is the same, with filters.
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projects, with members, keys and limits. **A** adds an organization. On a
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row: add a team or project inside it, rename, move, limits for the level and
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for each of its members, its capacity quota, and for a project how long
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conversations and agent notes are kept. **Remove** takes away only something
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empty.
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conversations and agent notes are kept. **Longest key lifetime…** caps how
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long a key made there may live, and is the expiry of one made without any
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(`llmgw keys ttl`; `auth.max_key_ttl` in server.yaml caps every key).
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**Remove** takes away only something empty.
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Limits are requests and tokens a minute, a budget per day or month, and the
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models allowed. Each level only narrows what is above it.
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+23
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@@ -325,8 +325,15 @@ llmgw keys list --store … --project default
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minute. It is the column that tells you whether a key is still in use, which is
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what makes rotation safe:
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**To rotate**, issue the new key, let both work while the user switches, watch
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`LAST USED` on the old one stop moving, then revoke it.
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**To rotate**, `llmgw keys rotate <key-id> --overlap 48h` issues a new key with
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the same project, owner and limits and lets the old one work for the overlap,
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then stop. Watch `LAST USED` on the old one stop moving before it runs out.
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**To cap how long keys live**, `llmgw keys ttl project:Acme/ml/train 720h` (or
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`team:`, `org:`; `off` removes it), and `auth.max_key_ttl` in server.yaml for
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every key. A key is made within the shortest limit that applies, and one asked
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for without an expiry gets that limit. `keys list --all` shows each key's kind
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— service (a project's), member, personal — and when it expires.
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```
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llmgw keys revoke --store … key-mpmip77twpt7qaxc
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@@ -433,21 +440,26 @@ Three things are deliberately not there:
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| `llmgw keys create` | Issuing a credential on another person's behalf |
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Each of those turns a stolen admin cookie into more than it was, and each is
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rare enough that a shell is no hardship. Cordon, drain and everything else that
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touches the cluster are also CLI-only for the same reason: the dashboard shows
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the cluster, it does not steer it.
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rare enough that a shell is no hardship. Cordon and drain are CLI-only for the
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same reason; what the pages do change on the cluster — serving models through
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the mirror, a node's engines — needs the `operator` or `admin` staff role.
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Every administrative action is logged with who did it, including the ones that
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were refused.
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Every administrative change is recorded in the audit log — who, when, through
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what, the fields given with secrets taken out, and how it ended, refusals
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included: `llmgw ctl audit`, or **Audit** in the console.
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## What this does not do
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- **No email.** No approval notice, no self-service password reset, no address
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verification. The loop is manual on purpose at this size; if it stops being
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the right size, that is the thing to automate.
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- **No SSO.** Accounts are local, with local passwords.
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- **No roles.** There is one flag, `is_admin`, and it grants looking at the
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dashboard. Everything else an administrator does is the CLI, and having a
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shell here is what makes someone one.
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- **Single sign-on is optional.** With `auth.oidc` people sign in through
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your identity provider, and SCIM 2.0 (`auth.scim`) creates, updates and
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suspends accounts from it; see [install.md](install.md#single-sign-on).
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Without them accounts are local, with local passwords.
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- **Staff roles are coarse.** `viewer`, `operator`, `billing` and `admin`
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(`llmgw users role`) decide what someone may see and do under /admin; an
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organization's manager can view it but not change it. Every change is in
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the audit log (`llmgw ctl audit`).
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- **Rate limits are per gateway instance.** With two instances each counts its own,
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so the effective limit doubles. v1 is single-instance by design.
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