Console: rotate a key, cap key lifetimes, test the webhooks; README, onboarding and console docs caught up

The README's status stopped at v0.9 and listed gaps since closed; onboarding
still said there was no SSO and no roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ilker ManapandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-04 17:28:24 +02:00
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@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ and power, and each model's requests a second. The history comes from the
Prometheus named by `monitoring.prometheus` in server.yaml; without one the
charts draw what this console has seen since it opened, and say so. Network
and disk come from each machine's node exporter, which `llmgw node add`
installs. A node's and a model's own pages have their charts too, over the
installs. **N** sends a test notification to each webhook in server.yaml's
`notify` section and says how each answered (`llmgw ctl notify test`). A node's and a model's own pages have their charts too, over the
same range.
**Nodes** lists every node with its state, load, GPUs, replicas, disk and
@@ -158,7 +159,9 @@ project, their limits, a new password (their sessions close), delete.
**API keys** — every key, its project, owner, state and last use. **A**
issues one; the key is shown once, in the result, and never again. On a row:
its limits, or revoke it.
its limits, **Rotate…** — a new key with the same project, owner and limits,
the old one working on for the overlap you give (`llmgw keys rotate`) — or
revoke it.
**Accounts** rows also have **Staff role…**:
- `viewer` looks at every page under /admin and changes nothing;
@@ -182,8 +185,10 @@ with anything secret taken out. `llmgw ctl audit` is the same, with filters.
projects, with members, keys and limits. **A** adds an organization. On a
row: add a team or project inside it, rename, move, limits for the level and
for each of its members, its capacity quota, and for a project how long
conversations and agent notes are kept. **Remove** takes away only something
empty.
conversations and agent notes are kept. **Longest key lifetime…** caps how
long a key made there may live, and is the expiry of one made without any
(`llmgw keys ttl`; `auth.max_key_ttl` in server.yaml caps every key).
**Remove** takes away only something empty.
Limits are requests and tokens a minute, a budget per day or month, and the
models allowed. Each level only narrows what is above it.
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@@ -325,8 +325,15 @@ llmgw keys list --store … --project default
minute. It is the column that tells you whether a key is still in use, which is
what makes rotation safe:
**To rotate**, issue the new key, let both work while the user switches, watch
`LAST USED` on the old one stop moving, then revoke it.
**To rotate**, `llmgw keys rotate <key-id> --overlap 48h` issues a new key with
the same project, owner and limits and lets the old one work for the overlap,
then stop. Watch `LAST USED` on the old one stop moving before it runs out.
**To cap how long keys live**, `llmgw keys ttl project:Acme/ml/train 720h` (or
`team:`, `org:`; `off` removes it), and `auth.max_key_ttl` in server.yaml for
every key. A key is made within the shortest limit that applies, and one asked
for without an expiry gets that limit. `keys list --all` shows each key's kind
— service (a project's), member, personal — and when it expires.
```
llmgw keys revoke --store … key-mpmip77twpt7qaxc
@@ -433,21 +440,26 @@ Three things are deliberately not there:
| `llmgw keys create` | Issuing a credential on another person's behalf |
Each of those turns a stolen admin cookie into more than it was, and each is
rare enough that a shell is no hardship. Cordon, drain and everything else that
touches the cluster are also CLI-only for the same reason: the dashboard shows
the cluster, it does not steer it.
rare enough that a shell is no hardship. Cordon and drain are CLI-only for the
same reason; what the pages do change on the cluster — serving models through
the mirror, a node's engines — needs the `operator` or `admin` staff role.
Every administrative action is logged with who did it, including the ones that
were refused.
Every administrative change is recorded in the audit log — who, when, through
what, the fields given with secrets taken out, and how it ended, refusals
included: `llmgw ctl audit`, or **Audit** in the console.
## What this does not do
- **No email.** No approval notice, no self-service password reset, no address
verification. The loop is manual on purpose at this size; if it stops being
the right size, that is the thing to automate.
- **No SSO.** Accounts are local, with local passwords.
- **No roles.** There is one flag, `is_admin`, and it grants looking at the
dashboard. Everything else an administrator does is the CLI, and having a
shell here is what makes someone one.
- **Single sign-on is optional.** With `auth.oidc` people sign in through
your identity provider, and SCIM 2.0 (`auth.scim`) creates, updates and
suspends accounts from it; see [install.md](install.md#single-sign-on).
Without them accounts are local, with local passwords.
- **Staff roles are coarse.** `viewer`, `operator`, `billing` and `admin`
(`llmgw users role`) decide what someone may see and do under /admin; an
organization's manager can view it but not change it. Every change is in
the audit log (`llmgw ctl audit`).
- **Rate limits are per gateway instance.** With two instances each counts its own,
so the effective limit doubles. v1 is single-instance by design.